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The Prudent Prosecutor
LESLIE C. GRIFFIN*
Because we are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the
significance of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the
entire record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful
questions in favor of disclosure.
"The prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in favor of disclo-
sure." 2 I adopt the prudent prosecutor from United States v. Agurs, a Supreme
Court case about the prosecutor's disclosure obligations. The case is short, but it
encapsulates many of the features that complicate the standards of prosecutorial
ethics. James Sewell was stabbed to death by Linda Agurs in a motel room. He
was killed with one of the two knives he was carrying. He had deep stab wounds;
she had "no cuts or bruises of any kind, except needle marks on her upper arm.
Her defense was that when he attacked her she killed him in self-defense. She
was convicted of second degree murder.
Three months later, Agurs' lawyer filed a motion for a new trial. The motion was
based on his discovery that Sewell had a prior criminal record (one guilty plea to assault
and carrying a deadly weapon, and another to carrying a deadly weapon). "Apparently
both weapons were knives." 4 The prosecutor knew about the record before trial
and did not disclose it. Defense counsel had not requested the evidence.
The Supreme Court ruled that Agurs was not entitled to a new trial. The Court
accepted the trial judge's determination that Sewell's prior record was cumulative
of the evidence presented at trial and did not contradict any evidence presented
by the prosecutor. The wound evidence, moreover, contradicted the claim of
self-defense. Agurs was not deprived of her right to a fair trial. Accordingly,
"there was no constitutional violation requiring that the verdict be set aside; and
absent a constitutional violation, there was no breach of the prosecutor's
constitutional duty to disclose."5
* Associate Professor, Santa Clara University School of Law; J.D., Stanford Law School; Ph.D. Yale
University. I am grateful to Kathleen Clark, Adam Rosman, Gerard Lynch, Mark Strasser, Tom Grey, Bob
Drinan, Mitt Regan, Bernadette Sargeant, Abbe Smith, and Jerry Uelmen for their help in developing the
argument presented in this Article, and to the organizers of the conference, including Brian Buescher, Dennis
Taylor, and John Phillips. Nadine Matta provided excellent research assistance.
1. United States v. Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 108 (1976) (emphasis added).
2. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
3. Id. at 100.
4. Id. at 101.
5. ld. at 108.
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In its ruling, the Court distinguished Agurs' motion from appeals based on
newly discovered evidence. In new evidence cases, the appellant faces the
"severe burden of demonstrating that newly discovered evidence probably would
have resulted in acquittal."6 In making this distinction, the Court referred to the
prosecutor's special responsibility to justice. "If the standard applied to the usual
motion for a new trial based on newly discovered evidence were the same when
the evidence was in the State's possession as when it was found in a neutral
source, there would be no special significance to the prosecutor's obligation to
serve the cause ofjustice."7
For disclosure cases, the Court asserted that under Brady v. Maryland,8
prosecutors must disclose "obviously exculpatory" evidence even absent a
request from the defendant. The Court, however, rejected the Court of Appeals'
holding that "the prosecutor has a constitutional obligation to disclose any
information that might affect the jury's verdict," 9 and opted for a reasonable
doubt standard. "If there is' no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or not the
additional evidence is considered, there is no justification for a new trial."1
Sewell's convictions were not "obviously exculpatory," nor did they establish
reasonable doubt. Agurs' right to a fair trial was not denied. "[T]he prosecutor
will not have violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is
of sufficient significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair
trial." 1
In its ruling, the Court also noted that its review of disclosure focuses on the
evidence, not the prosecutor. "Nor do we believe the constitutional obligation is
measured by the moral culpability, or the willfulness, of the prosecutor. If the
suppression of evidence results in constitutional error, it is because of the
character of the evidence, not the character of the prosecutor."12 At the same
time, it recognized the difficulty of characterization of the evidence in these
cases:
Nevertheless, there is a significant practical difference between the pretrial
decision of the prosecutor and the post-trial decision of the judge. Because we
are dealing with an inevitably imprecise standard, and because the significance
of an item of evidence can seldom be predicted accurately until the entire
record is complete, the prudent prosecutor will resolve doubtful questions in
favor of disclosure. But to reiterate a critical point, the prosecutor will not have
6. Id. at Ill.
7.' Id. at I I I (emphasis added).
8. Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the prosecutor's suppression of exculpatory evidence
violates due process).
9. Agurs, 427 U.S. at 108 (emphasis added).
10. Id. at 112-13.
11. Id. at 108.
12. Id. at 110 (emphasis added).
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violated his constitutional duty of disclosure unless his omission is of sufficient
significance to result in the denial of the defendant's right to a fair trial. '
3
The dissent also invoked the "prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of
justice" - in order to criticize the high reasonable doubt standard set by the
majority. "The burden thus imposed on the defendant is at least as 'severe' as, if
not more 'severe' than, the burden he generally faces on a [newly discovered
evidence case.] ... The 'prosecutor's obligation to serve the cause of justice' is
reduced to a status, to borrow the Court's words, of no special significance."
1 4
Agurs illustrates many features of prosecutorial ethics. Both majority and
dissent invoke the high professional ideal of the "prosecutor's obligation to serve
the cause of justice," but disagree about its meaning. The Court identifies a
mandatory rule for prosecutors under Brady: the requirement to turn over
"obviously exculpatory" evidence, with or without a request from the defense
attorney. The Court also acknowledges, however, that it is difficult to characterize
evidence. The pre-trial perspective of the prosecutor may not match that of the
trial or appellate judge. The Court is indifferent to the moral culpability of the
prosecutor as long as the defendant receives a fair trial. There is a tension
between the professional and constitutional standards. It is not clear that the
constitutional standard sets a high professional standard or a clear disciplinary
rule. Prosecutorial misconduct may remain undiscovered if defendants face a
high threshold for challenging the fairness of the trial. Finally, as a last resort, the
Court recommends prudence, which appears to set a standard higher than that
required by the Constitution.
By "prudent," the Supreme Court presumably meant cautious or careful,
perhaps pragmatic. Prudence also means the habit of good judgment. Prosecutors
need good judgment (not just caution or pragmatism) because a large part of their
job is discretionary. Indeed, in recent years, the discretionary part of prosecution
has expanded. The concepts of good judgment and discretion, however, remain
ambiguous. Accordingly, in this Article I focus on the discretionary component of
prosecutorial practice and ethics. Part I identifies the centrality of discretion to
prosecution. Despite differences of opinion about the merits of discretion,
prosecutorial discretion has expanded in recent years. After explaining why
discretion is needed in criminal prosecution in Part I(A), I identify in Part I(B)
when it applies: in investigation, charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing. I
report in Part I(C) that prosecutorial discretion may be unfettered. Appropriate
judicial, legislative, or administrative review may not occur, leaving prosecuto-
rial discretion unreviewed and unreviewable.
Because of the range of prosecutorial discretion and its unreviewable quality
as described in Part I, numerous proposals for the reform of prosecutorial
13. Id. at 108 (emphasis added).
14. Id. at 115-16.
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discretion have been advanced. Part II examines these reforms, which include
calls for new, more specific standards; better enforcement of those standards
through supervision, oversight, and training; and improved judgment by indi-
vidual prosecutors. These latter suggestions include recommendations for better
moral as well as legal judgment by prosecutors.
The proposals and the uncertainty about discretion raise the question: Does
one need good moral judgment in order to be a good prosecutor? In Part III, I
explore what insights legal ethics offers on that question. Parts III(A) and III(B)
distinguish substantive moral and substantive legal judgment. I argue that - like
all human persons - individual prosecutors must make their own judgments
about the morality of their jobs and the obligations they impose. In these
circumstances, prosecutors appropriately rely on substantive theories of morality
as they decide whether to be prosecutors or whether to enforce laws and policies
that they conclude are unjust.
Such substantive moral judgment, however, is not the core of prosecutorial
discretion. In Part III(C), I argue that prosecutorial discretion requires public
moral judgment, a judgment rooted in prosecutorial practice and experience.
Prosecutorial discretion is not the same as moral discretion; prosecutors should
not become moral entrepreneurs who make discretionary decisions according to
their own substantive theories of justice. Their legal role does not permit
unfettered moral discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion requires attention to office policies and procedures.
Prosecutorial offices should develop specific policies of discretion and mandate
training, consultation, supervision and review of discretionary choices. "While
strict rules designed to meet every conceivable situation would be impossible,
detailed outlines, explicit hypotheticals, and mechanisms for accountability are
feasible and needed." 15 Policies alone cannot promote good judgment, however.
That is developed through training by more experienced prosecutors and through
consultation with peers and supervisors. Accordingly, in all matters, prosecutors
should test their judgment by consulting fellow prosecutors. In addition, "[i]n any
non-routine or high-profile matter ... the investigating prosecutor should seek
supervisory review and approval of his or her proportionate evaluation before
proceeding." 16
"Meaningful control of discretion is impossible without at least some form of
internal administrative review.' 7 Therefore, each prosecutorial office needs
regular review of discretionary decisions. Courts may, with good reason, remain
reluctant to police prosecutorial misconduct and discretion; disciplinary agencies
15. Comment, Justice Department's Prosecution Guidelines of Little Value to State and Local Prosecutors,
72 J. CRIm. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 955, 961 (1981).
16. Rory K. Little, Proportionality as an Ethical Precept for Prosecutors in Their Investigative Role, 68
FORDIAM L. REV. 723,752-53 (1999).
17. Comment, supra note 15, at 965.
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can fill in some of the gaps. Consultation, supervision, and reporting require-
ments should be recorded. Failure to consult with peers or supervisors, or to seek
review of discretionary decisions provides an identifiable basis for disciplinary
sanction, one more enforceable than the post-trial standards of review employed
in Agurs.
I. PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
Ethical codes and case law provide some mandatory norms for prosecutors.
The exercise of discretion is also an important component of the prosecutor's job.
Discretion is employed, for example, in the investigation of cases, in charging
decisions, in plea bargaining, and in sentencing. Many commentators have
concluded that the role of discretion in prosecution has expanded in recent years,
as have the prosecutor's powers in the criminal justice system. 18 Long before this
expansion, however, the subject of discretion attracted extensive critical commen-
tary and constructive suggestions for improvement.
A. WHY DISCRETION IS NEEDED
Numerous arguments support a prominent role for prosecutorial discretion in
our system of justice. First, as Professor LaFave argued in 1970, our system has
"legislative overcriminalization;" 9 there are so many criminal statutes that
prosecutors should not enforce them all. This point is arguably more correct in
2001 than it was in 1970.20 Given the abundance of federal and state criminal
statutes, "prosecutors must exercise judgment about which of the many cases that
are technically covered by the criminal law are really worthy of criminal
punishment. 2 t Moreover, because there are so many statutes, some analysts
have argued that prosecutors are more suited than the legislature to adapt the
criminal law to new circumstances and to identify when the prosecution of
18. See, e.g., Bennett L. Gershman, The New Prosecutors, 53 U. Prrr. L. REV. 393 (1992) (describing
escalation of prosecutor's investigating, charging, convicting, and sentencing powers).
19. Wayne R. LaFave, The Prosecutor's Discretion in the United States, 18 AM. J. COMP. LAW 532, 533-35
(1970).
20. See Steven D. Clymer, Unequal Justice: The Federalization of Criminal Law, 70 S. CAL. L. REV. 643,
718-19 (1997).
21. Gerard E. Lynch, Our Administrative System of Criminal Justice, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 2117, 2136-37
(1998) (emphasis added); see also id. at 2138-39 (explaining that prosecutorial discretion may be more effective
than attempts to reform the penal code); Gerard E. Lynch, The Role of Criminal Law in Policing Corporate
Misconduct, 60 LAW & CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS 23, 36-37 (Summer 1997) ("While the expansion of civil or
regulatory alternatives to traditional criminal law has reduced the primacy of criminal justice as a vehicle for
imposing punitive remedies for the most serious misconduct, the same period has seen a marked expansion of
the criminal law itself .... Prosecutors and courts, moreover, have utilized the broad discretion created by the
criminalization of regulatory misconduct or by the vague terms of some criminal statutes, to change the terms in
which certain forms of misbehavior are seen, and the consequences that attach to violations."); RONALD
DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 31 (1978) ("[Criminal law] cannot be applied mechanically but demand[s]
the use of judgment.") (emphasis added).
2001]
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certain statutes would be anachronistic. "The need for discretion ... also arises
because public attitudes change over time, and it is not always possible
immediately to .adapt the statutory law to these changes. The exercise of
discretion may also function as an informal means of testing public reaction to a
change in enforcement practice that may lead to legislative revision in the
area."
22
Second, even if it were a good idea to prosecute all violations of all criminal
statutes, prosecutors cannot do so because of "limitations in available enforce-
ment resources., 23 Prosecutors do not have the ability to punish all crimes. Their
budgets constrain their capacity to try cases and force administrators to develop
policies that allow prosecution of some crimes but not others. Police resources,
court schedules, and prison capacity may impose similar constraints.
Third, discretion is necessary because even the most detailed criminal statutes
and office guidelines cannot codify every aspect of a prosecution. Individual
discretion is required to determine how to apply laws and policies to the facts of
the case. "The need for discretion arises in part because of the difficulty of
encompassing within necessarily general rules the myriad circumstances that
may be deemed relevant to a pending decision.",24 For example, office policies
can provide guidance about what crimes the office will prosecute, but cannot tell
prosecutors how to weigh the credibility of witnesses and how to assess other
facts of specific cases. 25 These factual determinations will decide who will be
prosecuted and what prosecutions will be declined.
Finally, there is an additional "need [for prosecutors] to individualize
justice.",26 Some prosecutions might cause undue harm to the offender. The harm
to the victim may be corrected without prosecution, or victims may ask that
22. Norman Abrams, Internal Policy: Guiding the Exercise of Prosecutorial Discretion, 19 UCLA L. REv. 1,
3 (1971); see also Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2138 (explaining that we should keep
criminal laws on the books for their symbolic value while recognizing that we should not have full enforcement
of those laws).
23. See LaFave, supra note 19, at 533-35; see also James Vorenberg, Decent Restraint of Prosecutorial
Power, 94 HARV. L. REv. 1521, 1542-43 (1981) ("Funding levels determine how many cases can be brought and
inevitably force prosecutors' offices to give little or no attention to many chargeable crimes. Limited funding
may also preclude some complex, costly investigations and prosecutions. Finally, the resources and interests of
other agencies - police, courts, and correctional institutions - may limit the prosecutor's freedom of action,
notwithstanding his substantial control of the docket.").
24. Abrams, supra note 22, at 3.
25. Bennett L. Gershman, A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of the Charging Discretion, 20
FoRiDHAM UR. L.J. 513, 519 (1993); see also id. at 519 n.12 (1993) ("Most likely, guidelines could not be
sufficiently explicit to regulate prosecutorial discretion in fact-specific cases .... For instance, guidelines might
establish the following policies: what possession charge to bring when a weapon is discovered in a home or
place of business; what larceny charge to bring when the value of stolen property does not exceed a certain
amount; when to upgrade an unlawful trespass into a burglary charge; when to charge an automobile theft as a
felony rather than a misdemeanor. On the other hand, guidelines could not articulate how a prosecutor should
weigh degrees of credibility or degrees of certainty, considerations which are often at the core of the
prosecutor's charging decision.").
26. LaFave, supra note 19, at 534.
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offenders not be prosecuted.27 There are timeswhen a rigid application of the
rules may not do justice and when "flexibility" and "sensitivity" are necessary to
a just outcome.2 ' This tension between rigorous enforcement of the general
criminal laws and flexible adjustment to individual circumstances is a constant in
discussions about the merits of prosecutorial discretion. 29 Legislators and
prosecutors are always striving to strike the proper balance. The following
quotation summarizes the central aspects of that ongoing debate between rigor
and flexibility:
During the late 1960s and 1970s, academics and criminal justice experts
examined prosecutorial discretion and, in particular, focused attention on the
development of prosecutorial standards related to charging decisions. The
broad debate that ensued explored the tension between the countervailing
policy goals inherent in prosecutorial discretion: the goal of ensuring that
prosecutors charge in a uniform, consistent, and non-arbitrary manner must be
balanced against the need for sufficient latitude, flexibility, and sensitivity in
adjusting charging decisions to individual circumstances. Whether the tension
between these competing policy goals of flexibility and consistency can ever be
conclusively resolved remains in doubt.
Twenty years after the onset of the debate, prosecutorial discretion has
expanded rather than contracted. Today in the United States, commentators
typically view prosecutors - both on the federal and local level - as
possessing broad discretionary powers regarding investigatory and charging
decisions.
30
Battles over discretion continue unabated. On March 7, 2000, for example,
California voters approved Proposition 21, the Juvenile Crime Initiative Statute.
Under prior law, the decision to try minors in adult criminal court was made after
27. See id. at 534-35.
28. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 2 ("The major advantage of such discretion is that it provides early in the
decision-making process a flexibility and sensitivity not available in a system where prosecutorial decisions
must be made according to predetermined rules. It permits a prosecutor in dealing with individual cases to
consider special facts and circumstances not taken into account by the applicable rules."); see also GIRARDEAU
A. SPANN, RACE AGAINST THE COURT: THE SUPREME COURT AND MINORITIES IN CONTEMPORARY AMERICA 50
(1993) ("Although invidious discrimination is socially undesirable and legally indefensible, the presence of
humanizing discretion prevents the legal system from becoming artificial, insensitive, and mechanistic.").
29. See Abrams, supra note 22, at 3 ("There is a competing tension between the need in prosecutorial
decision-making for certainty, consistency, and an absence of arbitrariness on the one hand, and the need for
flexibility, sensitivity, and adaptability on the other."); see also Kalyani Robbins, No-Drop Prosecution of
Domestic Violence: Just Good Policy, or Equal Protection Mandate?, 52 STAN. L. REV. 205, 216 (1999) (A
no-drop policy in domestic violence cases "limits the prosecutor's discretion to drop a case unless he or she can
demonstrate a clear lack of evidence .... [An] effective no-drop policy does, however, leave some room for
prosecutorial discretion with regard to decisions affecting victims' safety." Id. Prosecutors may decide not to
allow victims to testify or may drop prosecutions if necessary to protect the victim's life and safety.).
30. Theodora Galacatos, The United States Department of Justice Environmental Crimes Section: A Case
Study of Inter- and Intrabranch Conflict Over Congressional Oversight and the Exercise of Prosecutorial
Discretion, 64 FORDHAM L. REV. 587, 641-42 (1995) (footnotes omitted).
2001]
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a juvenile court hearing.3 Proposition 21 gives adult criminal courts automatic
jurisdiction over minors charged with murder or one of certain enumerated sex
offenses. The decision to charge will determine the court's jurisdiction.32 Judicial
organizations characterized the legislation as a "power grab" by district attorneys
that would enhance prosecutorial discretion at the expense of judicial discretion.
The legislation also, however, adds to the list of serious felonies for which plea
bargaining is prohibited - an apparent restriction on prosecutorial discretion.33
Even those who agree that discretion is a valuable part of our criminal justice
system may disagree about who is best qualified to exercise it.
B. WHEN DISCRETION APPLIES
Prosecutorial discretionary power is quite broad and often unregulated. One
annual survey of criminal law reiterates this theme of the breadth and scope of
prosecutorial discretion each year:
Courts recognize a prosecutor's broad discretion to initiate and conduct
criminal prosecutions, in part out of regard for the separation of powers
doctrine and in part because "the decision to prosecute is particularly ill-suited
to judicial review." In the absence of contrary evidence, courts presume that
criminal prosecutions are undertaken in good faith and in a nondiscriminatory
manner. So long as a prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused
has committed an offense, the decision to prosecute rests within her discretion.
A prosecutor has broad authority to decide whether to investigate, grant
immunity, or permit a plea bargain, and to determine whether to bring charges,
what charges to bring, when to bring charges, and where to bring charges.34
1. INVESTIGATION
Professor Little has recently examined the neglect of investigation in the
prosecutorial ethical standards. He argues that "much of the modern-day
prosecutor's time is spent making investigative decisions, ' 35 including investiga-
31. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 707 (West 1999).
32. See id. at § 602(b) (giving automatic adult criminal court jurisdiction for prosecution of minors 14 years
or older for specified offenses.); see also SUE BURRELL, YOUTH LAW CENTER, ANALYSIS OF KEY PROVISIONS OF
THE "GANG VIOLENCE AND JUVENILE CRIME PREVENTION ACT OF 1998" 14 (1998) (on file with Author).
("[C]ompletely eliminate the safeguard of a judicial determination as to whether the minor can be rehabilitated
in the juvenile system. While most juveniles subjected to judicial fitness hearings in the past have been sent to
adult court, the previous system enabled courts to hold back a small group of juveniles where there were
mitigating circumstances to justify such a decision.").
33. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 1192.7 (West 2001) ("Plea bargaining in any case in which the indictment or
information charges any serious felony.., is prohibited").
34. Michelle A. Gail, Prosecutorial Discretion, 85 GEO. L. J. 983, 983-85 (1997) (citations omitted); Lara
Beth Sheer, Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1353-55 (1998) (same); Richard Bloom, Prosecutorial
Discretion, 87 GEO. L. J. 1267, 1267-68 (1999) (same).
35. Little, supra note 16, at 728.
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tory decisions about business fraud, public corruption, and organized crime.
Under the "investigative role" of the prosecutor, Little includes the prosecutor's
directions to law enforcement agents as well as prosecutorial advice to agents
who seek guidance about these investigations.36 He provides the following
catalogue of activities included in the prosecutor's investigative role:
Prosecutors have grand jury subpoenas for testimony and for documents or
other physical items at their disposal. They may seek search warrants and
various forms of electronic surveillance orders. They may authorize and
oversee secretive undercover investigations. They may order physical surveil-
lance of targets or witnesses. They may send agents to interview witnesses
overtly, at the witness's home or business. They may direct persons to provide
fingerprints, voice exemplars, or other non-testimonial items of physical
evidence. Finally, they may plea bargain with criminal actors, offering leniency
or even immunity, in return for undercover assistance against other criminal
targets and testimony later if requested.37
Although all criminal prosecution does not involve the prosecutor in investiga-
tion, "the importance of the investigative role lies not in the number of cases it
affects, but in the significance of the role in the matters where it arises.' 38
Accordingly, Little has proposed a new model rule of investigative discretion
that emphasizes the proportionality of prosecutorial judgment.39 Such a standard
is necessary because investigative tactics that may be legal are not always
proportionate. For example, criticisms of Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr's
tactics - namely the subpoenas of bookstore records, the decision to subpoena
Monica Lewinsky's mother to appear before the grand jury, and the surprise
interview of Lewinsky without her lawyer-raise questions of discretion, not
legality. Such tactics are employed by other prosecutors and are permitted by law.
Good prosecutors need more than legal tactics; they require good discretion
through proportionate judgment.
"Almost anything can spark the interest of an alert prosecutor.' 40 "When the
case is one of those numerically few but substantively important prosecutions,
36. Id. at 729-30; see also H. RICHARD UVILLER, THE TILTED PLAYING FIELD: Is CRIMINAL JUSTICE UNFAIR?
36, 36-37 (1999) ("These are the prosecutions for complex conspiracies, major frauds and other financial
crimes, political corruption, drug smuggling, or racketeering. Often invisible, frequently without an individual
victim to complain, these major cases would go unnoticed by the criminal justice system without the interest,
energy, and perseverance of the prosecutorial agencies. Protracted investigation, multiple choice points, and
options of all sorts are the hallmarks of these prosecutions. The special prerogatives of the public prosecutor are
most vivid in the development of these special cases.").
37. Little, supra note 16, at 737.
38. Id. at 728-29; see also Laurie L. Levenson, Working Outside the Rules: The Undefined Responsibilities of
Federal Prosecutors, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 553, 561 (1999) (identifying broad discretion that prosecutors have
to investigate in "that gap called investigative discretion").
39. Little, supra note 16, at 723.
40. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 37.
2001]
HeinOnline  -- 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 267 2000-2001
GEORGETOWN JOURNAL OF LEGAL ETHICS [Vol. 14:259
state or federal, that are begun from scratch by the prosecutor, the elements of
choice multiply and the prosecutor's authority to initiate prosecution becomes a
major factor in shaping the case to come.' Prosecutors possess broad
investigative discretion.
2. CHARGING
Prosecutors also have vast discretion to charge. The American Bar Association
("ABA") Model Rules and the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice acknowledge
one restriction on the charging decision, namely that the prosecutor's decision
must be supported by probable cause.42 That standard, however, may not be very
restrictive in practice, and may provide a low threshold for charging. If probable
cause is the only restriction on prosecutorial charging discretion, then it is a very
broad power indeed.4 3
The profession's response to this broad power has been to identify standards
that the prosecutor should follow in charging. The ABA Standards for Criminal
Justice exemplify these numerous attempts to mold discretion by identifying
factors that may be considered by prosecutors when they exercise "Discretion in
the Charging Decision:"
(b) The prosecutor is not obliged to present all charges which the evidence
might support. The prosecutor may in some circumstances and for good cause
consistent with the public interest decline to prosecute, notwithstanding that
sufficient evidence may exist which would support a conviction. Illustrative of
41. Id. at 36.
42. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.8(a) (1983) ("The prosecutor in a criminal case
shall: (a) refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable cause.")
[hereinafter MODEL RULES]; ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9(a) (1993):
A prosecutor should not institute, or cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of
criminal charges when the prosecutor knows that the charges are not supported by probable cause. A
prosecutor should not institute, cause to be instituted, or permit the continued pendency of criminal
charges in the absence of sufficient admissible evidence to support a conviction.
MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-103(A) (1980) ("[A] public prosecutor ... shall not
institute criminal charges when he knows or it is obvious that the charges are not supported by probable cause.")
[hereinafter MODEL CODE].
43. See Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U. L. REV. 669, 680
(1992) ("An ethical prerequisite of probable cause is essentially meaningless."); Tracey L. Meares, Rewards for
Good Behavior: Influencing Prosecutorial Discretion and Conduct with Financial Incentives, 64 FORDHAM L.
REV. 851, 864 (1995) ("It is clearly unethical for a prosecutor to charge an accused with offenses for which the
prosecutor knows there is no factual basis. The ABA's Model Ru-les Rule 3.8(a) provides that 'the prosecutor in a
criminal case shall... refrain from prosecuting a charge that the prosecutor knows is not supported by probable
cause.' However, the ethics rules do not clearly prohibit the prosecutor from deciding to charge an accused with
offenses which the prosecutor has probable cause to believe are factually justified but which the prosecutor
believes she probably will not be able to prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial.") (footnotes omitted);
MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHics 222 (1990) (contrasting the probable cause standard
with the stricter prima facie case standard of the National District Attorney Association and criticizing the
probable cause standard).
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the factors which the prosecutor may properly consider in exercising his or her
discretion are:
(i) the prosecutor's reasonable doubt that the accused is in fact guilty;
(ii) the extent of the harm caused by the offense;
(iii) the disproportion of the authorized punishment in relation to the
particular offense or the offender;
(iv) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(v) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(vi) cooperation of the accused in the apprehension or conviction of others;
and
(vii) availability and likelihood of prosecution by another jurisdiction.
4 4
These factors point to the ambiguity of standards for discretion. As the text of the
ABA standards states: "By its very nature, however, the exercise of discretion
cannot be reduced to a formula. Nevertheless, guidelines for the exercise of
discretion should be established.,
45
Professor Gershman highlights this ambiguity in an article that provides
specific guidance for charging: "This is not to say that the prosecutor's discretion
is unbounded .... Still no subject in criminal law is as elusive as that of
prosecutorial discretion in the charging process.",46 His essay illuminates the role
of discretion in the charging process by distinguishing general offenses from
specific cases. Although guidelines assist prosecutors with some decisions,
specifically about which offenses to charge, "[m]ost likely, guidelines could not
44. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9 (emphasis added); see also Rachel Ratliff, Third-Party
Money Laundering: Problems of Proof and Prosecutorial Discretion, 7 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 173, 180-81
(1996) (quoting 8 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S PROSECUTION MANUAL 504-06 (1993))
("The decision to prosecute (as well as the outcome of the prosecution) is extremely fact-dependent. Generally,
a prosecutor should charge a crime unless '[nlo substantial federal interest would be served by prosecution.'
Considerations of substantial federal interest include the following:
1) Federal law enforcement priorities;
2) The nature and seriousness of the offense;
3) The deterrent effect of prosecution;
4) The person's culpability in connection with the offense;
5) The person's history with respect to criminal activity;
6) The person's willingness to cooperate in the investigation or prosecution of others; and
7) The probable sentence or other consequences if person is convicted.") (footnotes omitted);
Galacatos, supra note 30, at 643 ("For example, the USAM provides government attorneys with some
guidelines concerning charging decisions; however, where the USAM provides such guidelines, it nonetheless
allows for broad prosecutorial discretion. The DOJ's Principles of Federal Prosecution also provide broad
guidelines that prosecutors should follow when making charging decisions. According to the PFP, each United
States Attorney and responsible Assistant Attorney General should establish internal office procedures
regarding prosecutorial decision making. The Principles also address the criteria prosecutors should consider
when initiating or declining prosecution, and expressly prohibit government attorneys from considering
political factors in making such determination."); but see Comment, supra note 15.
45. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9.
46. Gershman, supra note 25, at 513 (emphasis added).
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be sufficiently explicit to regulate prosecutorial discretion in fact-specific
cases." 47 A footnote explains the difference:
For instance, guidelines might establish the following policies: what possession
charge to bring when a weapon is discovered in a home or place of business;
what larceny charge to bring when the value of stolen property does not exceed
a certain amount; when to upgrade an unlawful trespass into a burglary charge;
when to charge an automobile theft as a felony rather than a misdemeanor. On
the other hand, guidelines could not articulate how a prosecutor should weigh
degrees of credibility or degrees of certainty, considerations which are often at
the core of the prosecutor's charging decision.4 8
As Professor Levenson has explained, charging discretion is not formulaic, but
instead requires prosecutors to fill in the gaps with their own judgment:
If deciding how to charge a case were as simple as reading a statute and
deciding whether its elements might apply to the defendant's behavior, then
new prosecutors who have demonstrated their academic acuity should be
equipped to handle the task. Experienced prosecutors know, however, that the
charging decision is much more complicated. The difficulty comes in
evaluating those factors that are not defined by statute, including the severity of
the crime, the defendant's role in the crime, the defendant's past and possible
future cooperation, injury to the victim, complexity in trying the case and the
likelihood of success. Prosecutors must be able tofill in these gaps in order to
perform their charging functions.4 9
3. PLEA BARGAINING
"The charging decision is the basic source of prosecutorial authority, but the
power to charge is enhanced by the prosecutor's role in plea bargaining and by
recent trends in sentencing." 50 Because the normal resolution of criminal cases
now occurs through plea bargains, not through criminal trials, the prosecutor's
discretion in plea bargaining is an essential component of the criminal system.
5 1
47. Id. at 519. See also Melilli, supra note 43, at 674-75 (Some aspects of prosecution (especially the kind of
offense charged) lend themselves to categories while case-specific factors do not. In the first category may be
offenses such as adultery that it would be anachronistic to prosecute. A policy could state that the office would
not prosecute adultery. In the latter are quantity and quality of evidence, factors that must be assessed by
individual prosecutors case-by-case); David A. Sklansky, Starr Singleton, and the Prosecutor's Role, 26
FORDHAM URB. L.J. 509, 532 (1999) ("The point I now wish to stress is that even when prosecutors operate
without formal guidelines, their charging decisions almost always involve, in part, the application of general
principles to particular situations.").
48. Gershman, supra note 25, at 519 n. 12.
49. Levenson, supra note 38, at 559 (emphasis added).
50. Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 717, 750 (1996).
51. See Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2120 ("[F]or most defendants the primary
adjudication they receive is, in fact, an administrative decision by a state functionary, the prosecutor, who acts
essentially in an inquisitorial mode.").
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Charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing are interrelated; discretion in each area
reinforces discretion in the others.
Once again, in plea bargaining the ethical standard is not very restrictive.5 2
Officially, "[t]he prosecutor should not bring or seek charges greater in number or
degree than can reasonably be supported with evidence at trial or than are
necessary to fairly reflect the gravity of the offense."'5 3 Broad charging discretion
and the low threshold for charging, however, give prosecutors extensive control
over defendants' pleas. The probable cause charging standards:
do not clearly prohibit the prosecutor from deciding to charge an accused with
offenses which the prosecutor has probable cause to believe are factually
justified but which the prosecutor believes she probably will not be able to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt at trial. ABA ethical standards specifically
geared to the prosecutor's function discourage this type of overcharging, but
they do not prohibit it. Similarly, a prosecutor who possesses enough
admissible evidence to pursue successfully a prosecution on a certain serious
offense against an accused but who nevertheless is willing to accept a guilty
plea to a less serious offense is not proscribed by the ethical rules from charging
the accused with the more serious offense to induce the defendant to plead
guilty to the lesser offense.54
Plea bargaining based on a low charging threshold may benefit the prosecutor,
as it encourages defendants to plead guilty.55 Professor Freedman has described
how the prosecutor's charging powers affect defendants. Once prosecutors
52. Professor Meares has argued that "[t]here are few rules of professional responsibility to guide the
prosecutor's decision making in the plea bargaining arena." Meares, supra note 43, at 864; see also ABRAHAM S.
GOLDSTEIN, THE PASSIVE JUDICIARY: PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION AND THE GUILTY PLEA 38 (1981) ("The only
limit imposed by the Court [in Bordenkircher v. Hayes] on the use of a threat to charge a more serious offense is
that the prosecutor must not 'bluff.' He must have probable cause to believe the defendant committed the
offenses that are the subject of his 'threat."'); id. at 43 ("In North Carolina v. Alford, where a defendant asserted
his innocence while pleading guilty, the court said the trial judge must find 'a strong factual basis' for the offense
to which he pleads. And in Bordenkircher v. Hayes, the court tied the prosecutor's charging discretion to the
existence of 'probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense defined by statute,' which would
seem to preclude both 'bluff' by prosecutor and hypothetical crimes.") (citation omitted).
53. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.9 (f). For examination of the limitations on plea bargaining,
see BENNETr L. GERSHMAN, PROSECUTORIAL MISCONDUCT § 7.1, at 7-3-7-4 (2d ed, 1999) [hereinafter
GERSHMAN, MISCONDUCT] ("A prosecutor is not allowed to use deception or intimidation against a defendant
that renders the plea involuntary. Nor may a prosecutor undermine a defendant's right to counsel by bargaining
privately with him. Courts closely monitor the extent to which a prosecutor can force a defendant to waive
constitutional rights. A prosecutor's failure to disclose exculpatory evidence in order to induce a plea may be
grounds for vacating the plea. A prosecutor's disparate treatment of similarly situated defendants also may be
grounds for vacating the plea. After a plea has been struck, the prosecutor must perform his side of the bargain.
He may not recommend a more severe sentence than agreed to, fail to recommend the agreed-upon sentence,
fail to dismiss other charges as agreed to, or fail to adhere to other promises.").
54. Meares, supra note 43, at 864-65 (footnotes omitted).
55. Id. at 865 ("Vast prosecutorial discretion at the charging stage allows the prosecutor to control the plea
context because it enables her to trade on the continuum between the quantity and quality of evidence necessary
to support a legitimate charge and the quantity and quality of evidence needed to prove that the defendant
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decide to charge, even innocent defendants may feel compelled to plead guilty
out of fear that a jury might convict them. "Although the defendant is innocent,
that presents no problem with the bargained plea. The law, in its even-handed
majesty, permits the innocent as well as the guilty to plead guilty in order to avoid
the coercive threat of extended imprisonment.,
56
Plea bargaining discretion also undermines uniformity of pleas. Professor
Zacharias has described the limitations of a discretionary standard in plea
bargaining. 57 He demonstrates that theories of plea bargaining (which vary from
office to office) influence the outcome of the case. Zacharias recommends that
prosecutors' offices establish more clarity and uniformity in these theories of plea
bargaining in order to avoid unbridled discretion.58
4. SENTENCING
Charging decisions influence sentencing as well as plea bargaining. "While the
formal act of sentencing rests with the court, a prosecutor's charging decisions
very much will dictate what the judge's options are at the time of sentencing. 59
Judicial discretion was the focus of the sentencing reform promulgated by the
Sentencing Guidelines (Guidelines). Proponents of the Guidelines argued that
judicial discretion over sentencing had led to inconsistent and sometimes
arbitrary sentencing. The confinement of judicial discretion under the Guidelines
has also enhanced the discretion of the prosecutor.60
What has changed is the relative power of the prosecutor. To use Holmes'
dragon metaphor, in jurisdictions that have adopted sentencing guidelines,
three dragons of discretion have been dragged onto the plain. One (release
discretion of parole boards) has been killed and one (judicial sentencing
committed the charged offense. In short, there is a natural gap between the different standards of proof
necessary to support an ethical charge and the standard of proof required to obtain a conviction at trial.").
56. FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 220-21.
57. Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1121, 1150 (1998) ("[A]pplying
different theories of plea bargaining produces different conceptions of justice").
58. Id.
59. Levenson, supra note 38, at 565; see also Misner, supra note 50, at 748 (explaining how broad
discretion in charging impacts sentencing); Paul M. Secunda, Cleaning Up the Chicken Coop of Sentencing
Uniformity: Guiding the Discretion of Federal Prosecutors Through the Use of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1267, 1268 (1997) ("Because of the determinate nature of the
new sentencing system, decisions about how to charge a crime have become, in many cases, tantamount to
imposing the actual sentence. The increased importance in prosecutorial charging decisions has, in turn,
enabled the prosecutor to determine the parameters of plea bargaining before the negotiations have even
started.") (footnotes omitted),
60. Gershman, Prosecutors, supra note 18, at 418-19 ("The prosecutor has traditionally played a crucial role
at sentencing. That role has expanded dramatically as a result of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, which
produced the Federal Sentencing Guidelines. The Guidelines were specifically designed to restrict the
discretion of judges in imposing sentences. Such restriction has produced a corresponding enhancement in the
prosecutor's discretion to make charging decisions and to force persons to cooperate.") (footnotes omitted).
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discretion) has been significantly constrained. The remaining dragon (prosecu-
torial discretion), however, continues to roam the plain unrestrained.6 '
The prosecutorial dragon is unconstrained because power over sentencing
enhances the prosecutor's power to charge and to plea bargain. The sentence is
based on the charge and on the facts charged. Prosecutors gain more leverage in
plea bargaining because judges usually cannot overrule the sentences.
Once the decision to prosecute has been made, prosecutors again wield great
power in determining which offenses to charge. Although the U.S. Attorneys'
Manual states that charging crimes to induce a plea is impermissible, defense
lawyers accuse the government of "piling on" charges in order to induce plea
agreements and cooperative testimony. By charging multiple offenses, a
prosecutor exercises significant control over the sentence a defendant will
receive if convicted ....
Perhaps the most significant result of a prosecutor's discretion in charging
crimes is in the sentence. A former Assistant U.S. Attorney admitted that "a lot
of prosecutors view [length of sentences] as their benchmark." He told of a
prosecutor who is rumored to have a "thermometer" which "measures" his
career total years of sentencing. Since the advent of the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines, which severely limit judges' discretion in imposing sentences,
prosecutors may exert more control over a defendant's sentence than even the
judge.62
Moreover, prosecutors control the relevant conduct portions of the Guidelines.6 3
Prosecutorial sentencing discretion is also evident in the substantial assistance
provisions of the Guidelines. "Congress has authorized, and the commission has
implemented, a system in which the determination of whether a 'substantial
assistance' discount is to be granted is left solely in the unreviewed discretion of
the prosecutor. Its effect is to give to the prosecutor the sole key to leniency."
64
Thus the prosecutor's discretion is central to decisions to depart downward under
the Guidelines:
[E]mbedded in the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is Rule 5K1.1 which
explicitly provides that it is the federal prosecutor who must decide if a
downward departure from the guidelines is warranted for substantial assistance
61. David Boemer, Sentencing Guidelines and Prosecutorial Discretion, 78 JUDICATURE 196, 197-98 (1995);
see also David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New Criminal Justice
Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059, 1066 (1999) (footnote omitted) ("Sentencing reform arguably shifts discretion
from relatively independent judges to more political actors - prosecutors and legislatures. Thus, far from
solving the problem of discretion, sentencing reform may exacerbate it by increasing the likelihood that it will
operate to the disadvantage of the politically powerless.").
62. Ratliff, supra note 44, at 181-82 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
63. See Secunda, supra note 59, at 1273-74 (examining the four ways in which the Guidelines expand
prosecutorial control of sentencing).
64. Boemer, supra note 61, at 200.
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to the authorities. The prosecutor's decision is subject to review by the courts,
but only if refusal to file a substantial assistance motion was based on an
unconstitutional motive or not rationally related to any legitimate government
end. Otherwise, it is up to the prosecutor to determine what serves a "legitimate
government end." A prosecutor's decision as to whether to recommend a
downward departure for substantial assistance is guided, in large part, by the
prosecutor's personal evaluation of the defendant's assistance and its value to
the prosecutor's case. This decision making process requires judgment -
judgment gleaned from a prosecutor's experience and good faith willingness to
evaluate a defendant's attempt to provide cooperation.
65
The legacy of the Guidelines for discretion is mixed, as they limited
unwarranted judicial discretion but raised the specter of unlimited prosecutorial
discretion. In their study of the implementation of the Guidelines, Schulhofer and
Nagel describe an ambiguous legacy:
[T]he Guidelines have brought a degree of order and consistency to the
prosecutorial charging and bargaining decisions that affect sentencing. Having
noted this achievement, we nevertheless recognize that prosecutors exercise a
considerable degree of sentencing discretion through charging and bargaining
decisions. This discretion, if unchecked, has the potential to recreate the very
disparities that the Sentencing Reform Act was intended to alleviate.66
They also conclude, however, that "[c]ontrary to the claims of many judges, the
Guidelines have not transferred sentencing discretion from the court to the
prosecutor.,
67
Sentencing discretion includes decisions to seek the death penalty. The
New York capital punishment law, for example, provoked a debate about
whether the death penalty legislation allowed too much discretion to
individual prosecutors.6 8
65. Levenson, supra note 38, at 566 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Gershman, Prosecutors,
supra note 18, at 419-20 (explaining prosecutor's role in 5KI. 1 motions).
66. Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel, Plea Negotiations Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines:
Guideline Circumvention and Its Dynamics in the Post-Mistretta Period, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 1284, 1284 (1997).
67. Id. at 1284-85 (footnote omitted).
68. See, e.g., John A. Horowitz, Prosecutorial Discretion and the Death Penalty: Creating A Committee to
Decide Whether to Seek the Death Penalty, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 2571, 2581-88 (1997) (examining a clash of
decision-making authority between Governor Pataki and Bronx District Attorney Johnson); Anthony Neddo,
Prosecutorial Discretion in Charging the Death Penalty: Opening the Doors to Arbitrary Decisionmaking in
New York Capital Cases, 60 ALB. L. REV. 1949, 1950 (1997) ("[A]rbitrariness in sentencing may result because
of the unbridled discretion placed into the hands of individual prosecutors."); UVILLER, supra note 36, at 60
("'Seeking the death penalty' in a first-degree murder case in New York is part of the charging decision, and as a
wholly unstructured, unilateral, virtually unreviewable exercise of discretion, it is worrisome. Far more
consonant with the customary powers of initiation would be a decision by the prosecutor in the first instance to
charge the case as a capital crime, followed by a submission of that choice to the judgment of the citizens sitting
as a grand jury .... [T]he open-ended statute appears to be an invitation to arbitrary (or politically expeditious)
choice.").
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C. RESTRAINTS ON PROSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
The sentencing discretion debate is not new. Many commentators from past to
present have argued that prosecutorial discretion is insufficiently restrained or
even unrestrained. 69 Even supporters of discretion acknowledge that too much of
it is a bad thing. The critics have identified potential mechanisms of control,
including judicial, legislative, and executive oversight: review by disciplinary
agencies, intraoffice constraints (namely supervision and training, office policies,
and budgetary restrictions), and election or re-election by voters who approve or
disapprove of prosecutorial policies. There is much debate about the effective-
ness of these mechanisms.
70
1. JUDICIAL OVERSIGHT
Much prosecutorial discretion is unreviewed or unreviewable by the courts,
unless the prosecutor violates specific constitutional provisions. Separation of
powers leaves courts reluctant to intrude on executive decisions. As the Supreme
Court explained in United States v. Armstrong:
The Attorney General and the United States Attorneys retain "broad discretion"
to enforce the Nation's criminal laws. They have this latitude because they are
designated by statute as the President's delegates to help him discharge his
constitutional responsibility to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully ex-
ecuted.,71
The Court acknowledged that prosecutorial decision-making may be beyond
judicial competence and so worthy of deference:
Judicial deference to the decisions of these executive officers rests in part on an
assessment of the relative competence of prosecutors and courts. "Such factors
as the strength of the case, the prosecution's general deterrence value, the
Government's enforcement priorities, and the case's relationship to the
Government's overall enforcement plan are not readily susceptible to the kind
of analysis the courts are competent to undertake." It also stems from a concern
not to unnecessarily impair the performance of a core executive constitutional
function.72
69. See, e.g., Vorenberg, supra note 23 (identifying the broad unrestrained nature of prosecutorial power).
70. See, e.g., Misner, supra note 50, at 717 ("The great majority of the decisions made by the various officials
are effectively unreviewable either through judicial or administrative processes. In theory, the electorate holds
decision-makers responsible for their actions. However, because of the current diffusion of responsibility, the
electorate cannot easily scrutinize the actions of any one official or hold that official independently accountable
for the successes or failures of the entire system.") (footnote omitted).
71. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations omitted).
72. Id. at 465 (citations omitted). On separation of powers concerns, see GERSHMAN, MISCONDUcT, supra
note 53, § 4.3, at 4-6.
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For these reasons, courts restrict defendants' challenges and employ a standard
of review that is favorable to prosecutors. The "prosecutor's discretion is ....
subject to constitutional constraints"' of equal protection and due process.
These constraints prohibit selective prosecution and vindictive prosecution.74
Prosecutions cannot be based upon race, religion, the exercise of rights, or other
arbitrary classifications.75 It is difficult, however, for defendants to prove such
constitutional violations. "To obtain discovery on a selective prosecution claim, a
defendant must offer 'some evidence' of discriminatory effect and discriminatory
intent. 76 In order to prove selective prosecution, a defendant must prove that
similarly situated individuals were not prosecuted and that he was singled out for
prosecution on arbitrary grounds.7 7 The Court has set a high threshold of proof
for these cases and gives a "presumption of regularity" to prosecutorial decisions:
[T]he presumption of regularity supports their prosecutorial decisions and, "in
the absence of clear evidence to the contrary, courts presume that they have
properly discharged their official duties." In the ordinary case, "so long as the
prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an offense
defined by statute, the decision whether or not to prosecute, and what charge to
file or bring before a grand jury, generally rests entirely in his discretion.' 78
73. Way te v. United State, 470 U.S. 598, 608 (1.985); see also Michelle A. Gail, Twenty Sixth Annual Review
of Criminal Procedure, 85 GEO. L.J. 983, 985-86 (1997); Lisa Beth Sheer, Twenty Seventh Annual Review of
Criminal Procedure 86 GEO. L.J. 1353, 1355-56 (1998) ("There are other limits to a prosecutor's discretion, and
the judiciary has a responsibility to protect individuals from prosecutorial conduct that violates constitutional
rights. Such conduct usually involves either selective prosecution, which denies equal protection of the law, or
vindictive prosecution, which violates due process.") (footnotes omitted).
74. See GERSHMAN, MISCONDUCT, supra note 53, § 4.9, at 14-15. Selective prosecution is also prohibited by
the ethical codes. See FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 218 (reviewing AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDUCT
Rule 9.2 and comparable District of Columbia and MODEL RULES provisions regarding selective prosecution);
ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 3-3.1 (b) ("A prosecutor should not invidiously discriminate against or
in favor of any person on the basis of race, religion, sex, sexual preference, or ethnicity in exercising discretion
to investigate or to prosecute. A prosecutor should not use other improper considerations in exercising such
discretion.").
75. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 50-51 (discussing Wayte and Armstrong).
76. GERSHMAN, MISCONDUCT, supra note 53, § 4.10, at 4-17 (footnote omitted).
77. Id.; see also Gershman, supra note 18, at 441 ("The judiciary's unwillingness to set meaningful limits on
the prosecutor's charging discretion is the principal reason for the prosecutor's dominance over the criminal
justice system. Doctrines that purport to set limits are increasingly avoided or subverted. For example, the
doctrine of selective prosecution requires a prosecutor to charge in a non-discriminatory fashion. However,
there is a presumption that the prosecutor acts in good faith, and overcoming that presumption is almost never
successful.") (footnotes omitted); Robert Heller, Selective Prosecution and the Federalization of Criminal Law:
The Need for Meaningful Judicial Review of Prosecutorial Discretion, 145 U. PA. L. REv. 1309 (1997) ("Until a
model is established that provides for meaningful judicial review of prosecutorial discretion in the selective
prosecution context, as the fiduciary model does, perhaps it will take '[a]nother hundred years ... before a
defendant demonstrates to the Court's satisfaction that race played a role in his prosecution.').
78. United States v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 464 (1996) (citations omitted) (emphasis added); see also
Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2125 ("The ultimate decision whether to bring a charge,
moreover, or whether to accept a guilty plea or some other disposition in satisfaction of the government's
claims, is left to the prosecutor's essentially unreviewable choice.").
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"Everybody knows: selective prosecution is a long-shot defense, a very long
shot."
79
Sentencing is subject to review if the prosecutor's motive is unconstitutional,
and the defendant can meet a "substantial threshold showing." 80 "Although it is
the prosecutor's prerogative to recommend leniency under the Guidelines,
exercise of this discretion is reviewable if based on an unconstitutional motive.
Furthermore, the prosecutor does not have unreviewable discretion to impose or
waive the enhanced sentencing provisions available under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
by opting to charge and try a defendant in separate prosecutions or under a
multi-count indictment."
8
'
Apart from these constitutional constraints (which are difficult for defendants
to prove), courts defer to executive discretion for separation of powers reasons.
This deference helps to explain why, in his review of prosecutorial discretion,
Professor Misner concluded that many attempts to exercise judicial control over
prosecutorial discretion have failed:
Legislators, police, prosecutors, and prison officials have enormous discretion
as to most tasks for which they are responsible. Contrary to popular belief,
attempts to impose any sort of judicial or administrative review on the great
majority of the decisions of these offices have been grandly unsuccessful. To
date review of these decisions through the political process has only come
haphazardly. In those few areas in which the court has intervened, the recent
trend is for the court to retreat to a "hands off" policy. 8
2
While the "hands off" policy occurs in many areas of prosecutorial discretion,
Professor Gershman has argued that it is especially true of the decision to charge:
The prosecutor's decision to institute criminal charges is the broadest and least
regulated power in American criminal law. The judicial deference shown to
prosecutors generally is most noticeable with respect to the charging function.
79. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 52.
80. Philip Oliss, Mandatory Minimum Sentencing: Discretion, The Safety Valve, and the Sentencing
Guidelines, 63 U. CIN. L. REV. 1851, 1867 (1995) ("The Court [in Wade v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 1840 (1992)]
[ I determined that a defendant's claim that he provided substantial assistance does not entitle him to judicial
review of the prosecution's decision. The Court stated that the only circumstance that would limit the
prosecution's discretion is the appearance of an unconstitutional motive. Specifically, the Court concluded that a
defendant would be entitled to judicial review of the prosecution's decision not to make a substantial assistance
motion only upon his 'substantial threshold showing' that the prosecution had based its decision on an
unconstitutional motive, such as race or religion.") (footnotes omitted).
81. Gail, supra note 73, at 985-86; see also Sheer, supra note 73, at 1355-56; Richard Bloom, Twenty Eighth
Annual Review of Criminal Procedure, 87 GEO. L.J. 1267, 1270-71(1999).
82. Misner, supra note 50, at 736; see also Gershman, supra note 18, at 435-36 ("One of the most disturbing
developments in criminal justice over the last two decades has been the judiciary's failure to provide clear
standards that would place some rational limits on the prosecutor's discretion. The decisions are increasingly ad
hoc, and do not lend themselves to systematic analysis. They appear to allow the exercise of virtually unlimited
prosecutorial discretion, and drastically curtail the ability of defendants to prove the existence of prosecutorial
abuses.").
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Limited constitutional and statutory constraints on charging are manifested in
the presumption of prosecutorial good faith, and are reflected in the courts'
acknowledgment that they lack the knowledge and expertise to supervise the
prosecutor's exercise of discretion. The Separation of Powers doctrine merely
reinforces this policy of judicial noninterference. To the extent that sufficient
evidence exists, and no improper motivation is shown, the charging decision is
virtually immune from legal attack.83
Charging discretion includes discretion not to charge. "Courts... cannot review
decisions not to prosecute; thus, prosecutors possess ultimate discretion with
respect to declination decisions. 84
There is disagreement about the efficacy of judicial oversight. Professor
Uviller believes that the system can still catch the worst abuses of discretion.
[D]iscretion implies a large dose of deference in the judicial review of the
executive choices. And that makes the bulk of prosecutorial charging decisions
virtually unreviewable. But, significantly, it leaves the atrociously bad calls
vulnerable. For asserted abuses of discretion, prosecutors remain answerable to
courts.... Though rarely invoked, this oversight is a powerful constraint,
particularly insofar as it carries the potential for public disgrace.
85
Other students of discretion, however, always worry that "the exercise of
discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice,
either reasonableness or arbitrariness. '86 Some commentators see anarchy in the
courts' limited review:
The prosecutor's decision not to prosecute a case is virtually unreviewable.
Although for some this authority "borders on anarchy," the case law in both
federal and state jurisdictions have ignored the criticism and have only rarely
constrained the decision in any meaningful way. Likewise, decisions regarding
diversion programs, venue, immunity, and victim participation are left to the
83. Gershman, supra note 25, at 513 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted); see also Gershman, supra note 18,
at 442 ("Thus, in cases arising in almost every conceivable procedural context where a prosecutor has increased
charges after a defendant has exercised certain rights, the courts almost always defer to the prosecutor's
discretion. This pattern of judicial permissiveness also is exemplified in plea bargaining, immunity, and
dismissal decisions. As the Court observed, 'The Due Process Clause is not a code of ethics for prosecutors.'
The discussion that follows shows that even the code of ethics may not be the code of ethics for prosecutors.")
(footnotes omitted).
84. Galacatos, supra note 30, at 600; see also GERSHMAN, MISCONDUCT, supra note 53, § 4.5 (discussing
United States v. Cox, 342 F. 2d. 167 (5th Cir. 1965) where the Fifth Circuit held that the prosecutor could not be
held in contempt for refusal to prosecute); Meares, supra note 43, at 862 ("The prosecutor's decision to charge
an accused is largely subject to the prosecutor's discretion. The prosecutor's charging discretion is, for the most
part, unreviewable. So long as the prosecutor has probable cause to believe that the accused committed an
offense, the prosecutor is entitled to bring the charge. The prosecutor's decision, moreover, is rarely
second-guessed by the courts. Similarly, the prosecutor's decision not to initiate a prosecution or to dismiss a
prosecution is effectively unreviewable by the courts.") (footnotes omitted).
85. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 46-47 (emphasis added).
86. KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 3 (1969).
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unreviewable discretion of the prosecutor. Even claims of selective enforce-
ment are rarely successful. Attempts to convince prosecutors to publish the
guidelines for making prosecutorial charging decisions, even in such presti-
gious studies as the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice Prosecution Function
and Defense Function and the ALI's Model Code of Pre-Arraignment
Procedure, have generally gone unheeded. When guidelines have been drafted,
they have generally been so broad as to be of little predictive value.
87
Such commentary explains why law professors write about "the preeminent role
of the prosecutor ' 88 and conclude that the "prosecutor has been fairly described
as the single most powerful figure in the administration of criminal justice." 89
2. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT AND ELECTION
Legislatures pass the criminal legislation that is applied by prosecutors. They
can repeal - or re-enact - anachronistic statutes. Congress passed the
Guidelines in order to provide more appropriate limits to judicial discretion.
Perhaps Congress could improve the broad array of criminal statutes, with an
attempt to write "seamless, nonoverlapping" statutes.90
Legislation may place some limits on prosecutorial discretion, so that it is not
unfettered:
Although in most instances the exercise of prosecutorial discretion presents a
nonjusticiable political question, the executive branch is not free to exercise
this discretion whimsically. The oath of office binds executive officers to
87. Misner, supra note 50, at 743 (citations omitted); see also Gershman, supra note 18, at 407-08:
Commentators have described the prosecutor's discretion as potentially "lawless," "tyrannical," and
"most dangerous." The prosecutor carries out his charging function independent from the judiciary. A
prosecutor cannot be compelled to bring charges, or to terminate them. A private citizen has no
standing to bring a criminal complaint if the prosecutor decides not to prosecute. And the judiciary has
shown a remarkable passivity when asked to review the prosecutor's charging decisions. Indeed,
some courts have deferred absolutely to the prosecutor's discretion, even though that decision has
been shown to be demonstrably unfair. Thus, overcharging crimes, discriminating against defendants
for prosecution, improper joinder of charges or parties, vindictiveness, coercive dismissals, plea
bargaining abuses, and immunity violations, continue to occur regularly, without meaningful judicial
review or correction.
id. (footnotes omitted); but see UVILLER, supra note 36, at 34 ("It's certainly true that charging decisions are, in
the main, discretionary (which is just another way of saying there is no 'meaningful judicial review' if
Gershman meant by that close and regular supervision by a court). But I am dubious about the claim that
vindictiveness, coercion, abuses, violations, and other improprieties in the charging process are not subject to
concerned review by a judge. Also, whether abuses occur regularly (by which I assume Gershman means
frequently) is another matter, difficult to prove or disprove, depending largely on whose courtroom stories you
listen to - and how much credit you accord the storyteller.").
88. Misner, supra note 50, at 728.
89. Melilli, supra note 43, at 672; see also Robert H. Jackson, The Federal Prosecutor, 31 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 3, 3 (1940) ("The prosecutor has more control over life, liberty, and reputation than any other
person in America. His discretion is tremendous.").
90. Jeffrey Standen, Plea Bargaining in the Shadow of the Guidelines, 81 CAL. L. REV. 1471, 1519 (1993).
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support and defend the Constitution and thus establishes the duty to give due
regard to the lawmaking function of the legislative branch and the interpretive
function of the judicial branch. Therefore, the proper exercise of prosecutorial
discretion must be guided by what Congress has ordained the law to be,
informed but not dictated by the language of the statutes and their legislative
histories as well as by the interpretation of the law by the courts. And, within
these constraints, prosecutorial discretion must be exercised so as to promote
and protect the public interest.91
Congress has used its investigatory powers to examine prosecutorial decisions
by the Department of Justice, although they may be accused of politicizing
prosecutions when they do so. 92 Recently, Congress expressed its disapproval of
Department of Justice prosecutorial ethics rules by passing the Citizens
Protection Act ("CPA"), which requires federal prosecutors to comply with state
bar codes.93"Congress has, until the CPA, never seen fit to involve itself in
regulating legal ethics generally, let alone federal prosecutorial ethics. In part,
this hesitation may stem from Congress' fear that entering the field will encroach
upon the federal courts' realm of authority. ' 94 Unfortunately, when Congress
undertakes, such regulation, its product may be "remarkably unclear" and "mask
the complexity of the issues."9 5
Some lawyers conclude that office budgets provide an important limitation on
prosecutorial discretion.96 If so, then legislatures may exercise some control over
prosecutorial offices through their budgets. Professor Uviller emphasized the real
and important constraints that office resources place on the prosecutor:
91. William F Baxter, Separation of Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the "Common Law" Nature of
Antitrust Law, 60 Tx. L. REv. 661, 685-86 (1982); see also Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, The
Uniqueness of Federal Prosecutors, 88 GEO. L.J. 207, 250 (2000) ("In the law enforcement context, for
example, Congress could not order the cessation of a particular prosecution or order the indictment of a
particular defendant. It might, on the other hand, achieve the same results through less specific legislation.").
92. See Galacatos, supra note 30, at 641-42 (footnotes omitted).
93. Citizens Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, § 801 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 530B (1998)). For a history of the adoption of this legislation, see Zacharias & Green, supra note 91, at
211-15.
94. Zacharias & Green, supra note 91, at 211-15.
95. Id. at 210.
96. See Lynch, supra note 21, at 2139-40 (explaining that prosecutors' decisions "inevitably combine
judgments of desert with judgments of resource allocation"... and are thus "routinely influenced by questions
of priority and cost"); Baxter, supra note 91, at 688-89 ("The faithful execution clause imposes a duty on the
executive branch to utilize its discretion to promote the public interest. Every executive agency, therefore, must
allocate its resources to promote the public interest to the maximum possible extent, given the constraints
imposed by Congress in authorizing and appropriating funds. This rule applies to the use of resources in law
enforcement activities as it does in all other endeavors of the executive branch. Consequently, some selectivity
is required in initiating resource-consuming investigations and prosecutions.") (footnotes omitted); Robert W.
Gordon, Imprudence and Partisanship: Starr's OIC and the Clinton-Lewinsky Affair, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 639,
716 (1999) ("It is the combination of the political and budgetary constraints of prosecutors that makes our vague
and broad criminal statutes tolerable; and their breadth and vagueness in turn stop up the loopholes through
which serious criminals might otherwise escape justice.").
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To the public prosecutor, I say first: Relish your crowded docket; be grateful for
the multiple and diverse demands upon your attention. Do not curse your
stretched budget, your short-handed staff, or the tide of new cases perpetually
lapping at your beach. These constraints help teach you and your staff the fine
faculty of judgment. In the conscientious prosecutor's office, the urgency and
the variety of ordinary business present competing opportunities, and often on
various coordinates of importance. Both selecting a target for pursuit and
simply sorting out for prosecution, the harvest of the daily tide afford the
prosecutor the obligation of choice. The discharge of that responsibility
instructs the public officer that, while all cases standing alone are of prime
importance, taken together some must yield to others. Prosecutors frequently
use the phrase "the interests of justice;" it is not a purely rhetorical expression.
Its discernment is part of the daily job of the prosecutor - and it must be
learned the hard way. The art of triage is essential in the development of the
sense of justice, it turns out, and no decent prosecutor can survive without it.
As a prosecutor, I counted caseload as a burden. I longed for the freedom to
prosecute each case as though it were my only obligation. The burden turns out
to be a blessing. A full file cabinet does not dull sensibility and corrupt
judgment by the urgency of making dispositions, as I previously believed. It
provides the occasion for learning the difficult business of making comparative
evaluations. And this, I have come to think, is an important ingredient in the
sensible exercise of discretion.9 7
"The other main remedy for prosecutorial misconduct is public oversight."
98
Elected prosecutors may be constrained by public opinion and may be removed
from office if too many voters disapprove of their practices.
[E]xecutive officers - including, in most states, local prosecutors - are
periodically up for election. If the public dislikes the way their servant has been
exercising discretion, if the people think targets for prosecution have been
unfairly chosen or wrongly charged, the remedy is at hand. True, abuse of
authority by the regional United States Attorney may have a marginal effect, at
best, in the election of the President of the United States - the appointing
authority. But perhaps it is not so far-fetched to think that the President's
political party will suffer to some degree for the visible excesses of the
prosecutor. After all, other executive officers wield considerable discretionary
authority with considerably less visibility and no accountability other than the
party's periodic review by voters.
9 9
97. H. Richard Uviller, Poorer But Wiser: The Bar Looks Back at its Contribution to the Impeachment
Spectacle, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 897, 899-901 (1999) (emphasis added).
98. Fred C. Zacharias, The Professional Discipline of Prosecutors, 79 N.C. L. REv. (forthcoming 2001)
(manuscript at 38, on file with Author).
99. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 45; see also Zacharias, supra note 98 ("Misconduct within their offices -
even by lawyers whom they have not directly supervised - commonly becomes an issue during elections.").
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If election fails, then disciplinary agencies may do the job:
If the ballot, even in the best of democracies, is too remote to be an effective
constraint on prosecutorial discretion, administrative remedies are still avail-
able. Every self-respecting government office - and prosecutors are nothing if
not self-respecting - has some mechanism for integrity review. Admittedly,
reliance on such internal controls is a little like relying on the bar to "police
itself;" it risks the designation "naive." But for one skeptical observer, at least,
this is the place to put some attention and energy to work. Let's make
administrative control a serious undertaking.' 00
3. PROFESSIONAL DISCIPLINE
a. Findings of Misconduct
The debate is ongoing whether the discipline of prosecutors is "lax."' 0 '
Review of prosecutors by disciplinary agencies is important because their
professional conduct is unlikely to receive full review in courts of law.
Prosecutors possess absolute immunity for activities "intimately associated with
the judicial phase of the criminal process" and qualified immunity for investiga-
tive functions (including advising the police). 0 2 Absolute immunity applies to
prosecutorial advocacy while qualified immunity applies to investigative or
administrative acts. 10 3 Some courts have ruled that decisions whether to
prosecute or to initiate a prosecution without probable cause are protected by
absolute immunity. o
Separate professional review of prosecution is also important because the
appellate review of criminal trials (as in Agurs) focuses on the effect of the
misconduct on the defendant's trial and not on the specific intent of the
prosecutor. 105 Appellate review of criminal convictions employs a harmless error
standard. "By insulating prosecutors from serious misconduct, however, harm-
Some district attorneys may also face removal by the governor. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 68, at 2571
(discussing Governor Pataki's removal of District Attorney Robert Johnson and raising the question of who is
the proper official to control discretionary decisions about capital punishment).
100. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 45-46.
101. Gershman, supra note 18, at 443-46 (describing the "lax" discipline of prosecutors); see generally
Zacharias, supra note 98 Lesley E. Williams, The Civil Regulation of Prosecutors, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 3441,
3454-3457 (1999); Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998);
Bruce A. Green, Policing Federal Prosecutors: Do Too Many Regulators Produce Too Little Enforcement?, 8
ST. THOMAS L. REV. 69 (1995); Lyn M. Morton, Seeking the Elusive Remedy for Prosecutorial Misconduct:
Suppression, Dismissal, or Discipline?, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1083 (1994).
102. Williams, supra note 101 (quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409,430 (1976)); see also Little, supra
note 16, at 729 (citing Imbler, 424 U.S. at 430-31 (1976) and Burns v. Reed, 500 U.S. 478, 487-96 (1991)).
103. See Williams, supra note 101, at 3456-58 (reviewing Buckley v. Fitzsimmons, 509 U.S. 259 (1993)).
104. See id. at 3460 (citations omitted).
105. See generally Bennett L. Gershman, Mental Culpability and Prosecutorial Misconduct, 26 AM. J. CRIM.
L. 121 (1998) (arguing that a prosecutor's intent should be relevant to review of prosecutorial misconduct).
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less error review encourages a 'winning is everything' attitude with fairness
being a mere afterthought. Accordingly, many defendants have had their
convictions affirmed despite clear prosecutorial overreaching.' 0 6 Courts will
frequently refer errant prosecutors to disciplinary offices rather than issue
sanctions in the midst of a criminal case.
Like courts, disciplinary agencies have reasons not to review prosecutorial
misconduct rigorously. Professor Zacharias has stated that "[t]o the extent
discipline requires an investigation of the workings of a prosecutor's office,
disciplinary agencies may consider it invasive of the authority of a coordinate
branch of government." 10
7
My focus here is on prosecutorial discretion, not on all categories of
prosecutorial misconduct. The Model Rules encapsulate the general standard for
all attorney discipline: the violation of mandatory, but not discretionary, rules is
subject to professional discipline. "Some of the Rules are imperatives, cast in the
terms 'shall' or 'shall not.' These define proper conduct for purposes of
professional discipline. Others, generally cast in the term 'may,' are permissive
and define areas under the Rules in which the lawyer has professional discretion.
No disciplinary action should be taken when the lawyer chooses not to act or acts
within the bounds of such discretion."'0 8 We have seen that offices provide
guidelines to steer prosecutorial discretion. "Guidelines, however, do not have
the force of law, are easily evaded, and can be revoked at will."10 9
Professor Zacharias has demonstrated that prosecutors rarely face discipline
for their discretionary decisions." 0 "Allegations of prosecutorial misconduct
typically concern five broad areas of activity: abuse of office in the charging
stage; abuses in investigating crimes, including misuse of grand juries; pretrial
misconduct (particularly, misconduct in discovery); trial misconduct; and
miscellaneous other activity." '' Consistent with the Model Rules, however,
Zacharias explains that misconduct "does not always rise to the level of a
disciplinable offense. Disciplinary authorities, for the most part, are limited to
enforcing direct violations of specific prohibitions in the professional rules."' 1 2
Discretionary decisions are unlikely to be sanctioned.
Almost by definition, reasonable observers differ on what conduct is appropri-
ate in these areas. Thus, for example, so long as some evidence supports a
criminal charge, observers typically might disagree over the propriety of a
prosecutor's decision to support a police arrest pending further investigation.
106. Gershman, supra note 18, at 430-3 1.
107. Zacharias, supra note 98, at 35.
108. MODEL RULES scope cmt. 13 (emphasis added).
109. GERSHMAN, supra note 53, at 4-8.
110. See Zacharias, supra note 98.
Il1. Id. at 10.
112. Id. at 13.
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Similarly, some consider aggressive charging within constitutional limits to be
a valid exercise of discretion, while others consider it to be "overcharging."' 3
Accordingly Zacharias concludes that findings of prosecutorial misconduct are
more appropriately limited to the narrow range of areas that "include[s] primarily
pretrial and trial conduct that is specifically forbidden in the codes, engaging in
pretrial publicity, and the prosecutor's obligations to report other lawyers."' 1
4
The Annual Reports of the Justice Department's Office of Professional
Responsibility ("OPR"), which oversees the professional competence of federal
prosecutors, provide some support for Zacharias' conclusions. Their categories of
misconduct include abuse of prosecutorial or investigative authority; misrepresen-
tation to the court or opposing counsel; unauthorized release of information
(including grand jury information); improper oral or written remarks to the court
or grand jury; conflicts of interest; failure to perform duties properly; negligence;
unprofessional behavior; failure to disclose exculpatory, impeachment or discov-
ery material; criminality; and improper contacts with represented parties.
115
Many of the categories appear to cover violations of mandatory standards.
Moreover, the case summaries suggest that discretionary decisions are not
sanctioned. For example, four substantial assistance motions cases were dis-
missed without findings of misconduct.'1 16 OPR found no misconduct in one case
of allegations of improper issuance of a subpoena. Moreover, there was no
misconduct in a 1996 case in which the defendant alleged that she was charged
because she had testified against the government at a different trial. '
17
Misconduct was found, however, in cases that were not discretionary. For
example, OPR found misconduct in a plea bargaining and sentencing case, but it
was because of the intentional misrepresentation of the evidence, not due to
prosecutorial discretion." 8 (The government attorney said the inmate had used
his fists in a fight (a misdemeanor) although he used a knife (a felony).) OPR also
criticized the attorneys who did not follow the DOJ policy of presenting plea
bargains to a supervisor.' 19 Mandatory rules are more appropriate for discipline
than prosecutorial discretion.
113. Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
114. Id. at 16; see also UVILLER, supra note 36, at 46 ("It's difficult to conceive of a working system of
external peer or public review of the discretionary decisions of a prosecutor's office. Who would be qualified to
do the reviewing? And by what standards would it be done? The only system that occurs to me is already in
place: judicial oversight of prosecutorial discretion.").
115. See Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1997 Annual Report, Table 2, available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/97annual.htm [hereinafter OPR 1997]; Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal
Year 1996 Annual Report, Table 2 , available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/96annual.htm [hereinafter OPR
1996].
116. See OPR 1997, supra note 115 (summarizing Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year
1997); OPR 1996, supra note 115 (summarizing Examples of Matters Handled by OPR in Fiscal Year 1996).
117. See OPR 1997, supra note 115; OPR 1996, supra note 115.
118. OPR 1997, supra note 115.
119. Id.; see also OPR 1995, at 7.
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b. High Professional Standards - Judgment
Disciplinary agencies often state that their goal is the promotion of high
professional standards for everyone, not only the punishment of wrongdoers. The
purpose of the Office of Professional Responsibility, for example, is "to ensure
that Department of Justice attorneys continue to perform their duties in
accordance with the high professional standards expected of the Nation's
principal law enforcement agency."' 20 In his famous speech to prosecutors,
Attorney General Jackson urged that the prosecutor has "no better asset than to
have his profession recognize that his attitude toward those who feel his power
has been dispassionate, reasonable and just.'121
Prosecutors have practical as well as aspirational reasons to pursue high
professional standards. Their professional reputations depend on good
judgment. Even if they are not sanctioned for misconduct, poor judgment may
undermine prosecutions and lead to judicial or supervisory criticism or
review.
The OPR Public Summaries describe numerous situations in which
prosecutors employed "poor judgment" short of misconduct. For example,
OPR criticized the "extremely poor judgment" of a Florida United States
Attorney who called opposing counsel about a petition they were filing and
also "criticiz[ed] a judge in a conversation with a defense attorney."' 22 Two
Department of Justice attorneys "exhibited bad judgment" when they did not
inform the court that a witness had previously misrepresented his creden-
tials.' 23 Among the "mistakes of judgment" in that case was insufficient
consultation with ethics advisors and supervisors in the DOJ. 12 4 A Texas
Assistant United States Attorney "exercised poor judgment" when he did not
follow up on a claim by plaintiff's counsel that a Postal Service log was not
produced in discovery.' 25 A San Francisco Assistant United States Attorney
"used poor judgment in relying solely on his agents to obtain all statements"
made by a witness to the police because he had leads that the witness had
made several statements.' 26 A Colorado Assistant United States Attorney
"demonstrated very poor judgment" when he purchased stock based on
120. OPR 1997, supra note 115 (citing Attorney General order dated December 9, 1975).
121. Jackson, supra note 89, at 4.
122. Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into Certain Conduct of
United States Attorney Larry Colleton, at 4.
123. See Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Trial
Attorneys J. Jared Snyder and William H. Hutchins in United States v. Shaffer Equipment, Co., et al.
124. See Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Trial
Attorneys J. Jared Snyder and William H. Hutchins in United States v. Shaffer Equipment, Co., et al.
125. Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Assistant
United States Attorney Randall P. Means in Chilcutt v. United States, p. 5.
126. Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Assistant
United States Attorney Eric Swenson in United States v. Leung Tak Lun (The "Goldfish Case"), p. 2.
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information he received from a man he had previously prosecuted. 127 That
prosecutor was admonished by the United States Attorney to avoid such
conduct in the future. An Environment and Natural Resources Division
attorney "exercised poor judgment" in filing and interpreting certain mo-
tions.' 28 In all these cases, "poor judgment" short of misconduct resulted in
complaints about attorney misconduct and warranted extensive investigation
of the attorney's actions that resulted in some criticism. Good prosecutors
need good judgment.
Programs such as the 1994 Department of Justice Professional Responsibility
Office training program were created to foster high professional standards and
good judgment by prosecutors. 29 Representatives from the United States
Attorneys' Offices ("USAO") attend national ethics training seminars and
employ that training in the local office. Each USAO has a Professional
Responsibility Officer who counsels attorneys on how to avoid misconduct and
to achieve high professional standards - especially in the exercise of their
discretion.
Of course, it is difficult to train prosecutors to use good judgment without
knowing what good judgment is.
4. SEEK JUSTICE
The ethical standards for prosecutors provide one last constraint on prosecuto-
rial discretion. The prosecutor's duty is to "seek justice." 30 A justice standard,
however, may be as vague as discretion. Professor Zacharias has argued that
neither the ethical codes nor the interpretive literature assign much content to the
duty of justice, and so prosecutors fall back upon their own morality. 131
127. Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of Assistant
United States Attorney Robert E. Mydans, Oct. 27, 1997.
128. Summary of the Investigation by the Office of Professional Responsibility into the Conduct of
Environment and Natural Resources Division Attorney Pamela S. West in Mescal, et al. v. United States, et al.
129. See Little, supra note 16, at 768; see also Zacharias & Green, supra note 91, at 238-39 ("[The
Department of Justice] has established formal training programs through which its ethical understandings are
transmitted. In recent years, the Department has required United States Attorneys' Offices to appoint ethics
officers to address ethical issues. It has established the Office of Professional Responsibility specifically for the
purpose of internal regulation.").
130. MODEL CODE EC 7-13 (1994) ("The responsibility of a public prosecutor differs from that of the usual
advocate; his duty is to seek justice, not merely to convict."); see also MODEL RULES Rule 3.8 cmt. 1 ("A
prosecutor has the responsibility of a minister of justice and not simply that of an advocate."); Bruce A. Green,
Why Should Prosecutors "Seek Justice?," 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 607 (1999).
131. See Fred C. Zacharias, Structuring the Ethics of Prosecutorial Trial Practice: Can Prosecutors Do
Justice?, 44 VAND. L. REv. 45, 46 (1991) ("Although the special prosecutorial duty is worded so vaguely that it
obviously requires further explanation, the codes provide remarkably little guidance on its meaning. In effect,
code drafters have delegated to prosecutors the task of resolving the special ethical issues prosecutors face at
every stage of trial .... The interpretive literature is no more helpful than the codes in resolving these and other
ethical trial issues raised by the 'do justice' admonition. Scholars have focused exclusively on constitutional
requirements and on issues relating to prosecutorial policy at the pretrial and sentencing stages."); see also
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The "do justice" standard, however, establishes no identifiable norm. Its
vagueness leaves prosecutors with only their individual sense of morality to
determine just conduct. Some will decide that justice lies in conviction at all
cost; others will bend over backwards to vindicate defendants' rights - in the
process underestimating their obligation to the community to assure that
criminals are convicted. The result is inconsistent trial practice, both within a
single prosecutor's case load and among lawyers in the prosecution corps. This
vagueness also undermines professional discipline of prosecutorial miscon-
duct.' 32
"Justice" will not restrain unfettered discretion if it encourages prosecutors to
rely on their "individual sense of morality."
Professor Zacharias provides a limited, two-prong definition of prosecutorial
justice: "(1) prosecutors should not prosecute unless they have a good faith belief
that the defendant is guilty; and, (2) prosecutors must ensure that the basic
elements of the adversary system exist at trial."' 133 He rejects a vague justice
standard in favor of "precise ethical directives, either through formal rules, or,
when flexibility is desirable, rebuttable presumptions." 
134
The Justice Department has linked its ethical standards to the mandate to seek
justice. "A variety of evidence suggests that, as a general rule, the Department of
Justice takes its duty to serve justice to heart. Unlike most state and local
prosecutors' offices, the Justice Department continually has developed published
guidelines that reflect its understanding of prosecutors' duty to seek justice." 135
For prosecutors, established standards of justice are preferable to the individu-
al's application of her own sense of justice.
II. GOOD JUDGMENT
Because of the range of prosecutorial discretion and its unreviewable quality
as described in Part I, numerous proposals for the reform of prosecutorial
discretion have been advanced. They include some combination of calls for new,
more specific standards; better enforcement of those standards through supervi-
Green, supra note 130, at 616 ("The disciplinary rules, however, do not fully consider how prosecutors' duty to
seek justice may translate into different or more demanding professional obligations: Indeed, the rules barely
scratch the surface.").
132. Zacharias, supra note 131, at 48 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Lynch, supra note 21, at
59 ("Where the outcomes that can be expected in court are more severe than even prosecutors think are just or
necessary for the protection of the public, prosecutorial discretion stops being a matter of triage (deciding where
compromise from their preferred outcomes is necessary to maximize limited resources), and becomes instead
a matter of deciding what outcomes are morally appropriate in the prosecutors' own eyes."); Secunda, supra
note 59, at 1269-70 ("Federal prosecutors lack ethical guidance as to how to exercise their newly found
discretion .... This lack of guidance has left a vacuum, which, if not filled, might lead federal prosecutors to
follow their own notions of justice at the cost of fairness and uniformity in sentencing.").
133. Zacharias, supra note 131, at 49.
134. Id. at 50.
135. Zacharias & Green, supra note 91, at 238-39.
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sion, oversight and training; and improved judgment by individual prosecu-
tors. 136 Professor Little's proposed model rule for prosecutorial investigation
combines all three aspects of these reforms. He defends the "exercise of
publishing written standards"' 137 and insists that if such written standards are to
be effective, "prosecutorial duties of supervision, reporting, and training are also
essential."' 138 "Proportionality" provides the standard for individual judgment.
The supervisory and proportionality requirements are written into the text of the
proposed rule, with an insistence on reporting and review of prosecutorial
decisions. 139
136. See, e.g., Charles B. Bubany & Frank F. Skillern, Taming the Dragon: An Administrative
Law for Prosecutorial Decision Making, 13 AM. CRIM L. REV. 473, 495-96 (1976) (recommend-
ing a "system of controlled prosecutorial discretion" with "the following principal characteristics:
(1) published rules, guidelines, and policies; (2) established procedural safeguards within the prosecu-
tor's office; (3) increased centralization of prosecutorial power; and (4) limited administrative and
judicial review"); Vorenberg, supra note 23, at 1562-72 (identifying corrections for prosecutorial
discretion, including specific charging guidelines, screening conferences, a record of decisions, legislative
oversight, more careful drafting of criminal codes, broader judicial review based on new standards and
guidelines).
137. Little, supra note 16, at 726-27 ("In so proposing, it necessarily also argues that the exercise
of publishing written standards that attempt to guide prosecutorial discretion ethically is not a
meaningless exercise, even if the standards are largely aspirational and contextual, rather than prohibitory,
in form.").
138. Id. at 728 ("For any such investigative rule to be effective, prosecutorial duties of supervision,
reporting, and training are also essential. These concepts encompass not only a prosecutorial duty to provide
supervision, but also to seek supervision. Reporting of discretionary investigative decisions and training on the
ethical exercise of discretion should also be required for all prosecutors. These additional duties (to seek
supervision, to report, and to provide ethics training) should be expressly placed on prosecutors not only in the
investigative stage, but generally.").
139. See id. at 752-53. The proposed new rule's pertinent language is as follows:
1. A prosecutor is not obligated to take every possible step in the investigation of a suspected criminal
offense. Rather, the prosecutor should consciously engage in an analysis of proportionality in
choosing which investigative steps to pursue, and how aggressively to pursue them.
2. At a minimum, a proportionate investigative decision should consider:
(a) the monetary cost of the step, not just for the prosecutor's office, but also for any witnesses who
must comply with investigative demands;
(b) nonmonetary costs of the step, such as intrusions on privacy, potential harm to innocent third
parties, potential for violence or destructive harm, damage to the prosecution office's own
credibility or community standing, and any unnecessary interference with witness's ongoing
lives;
(c) the potential benefits of the step, and whether those benefits could be achieved by less intrusive
or costly means.
3. These costs and considerations should be balanced against the gravity of the offense and any
exigent time constraints.
4. A prosecutor should not approve a particular investigative step or strategy that reasonably
seems grossly disproportionate after evaluation, including supervisory evaluation as required
below.
5. Duty to Seek Supervision. In any non-routine or high-profile matter, or for non-routine investigative
techniques, the investigating prosecutor should seek supervisory review and approval of his or her
proportionate evaluation before proceeding.
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All prosecutorial discretion, not just investigation, requires improved stan-
dards, enforcement and good judgment.
A. STANDARDS
We have already seen that the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice and the
United States Attorneys' Manual provide factors to guide prosecutorial discre-
tion. I quote below a proposed set of administrative guidelines for prosecutors
that would be overseen by courts of law. They are representative of numerous
attempts to provide detailed criteria to guide discretion. The administrative
criteria in prosecutors' offices should include the following:
The basic standard should be whether in the prosecutor's judgment:
(1) a crime has been committed;
(2) the perpetrator can be identified; and
(3) sufficient evidence exists to support a verdict of guilty.
A second order of inquiry... [is] whether the benefits [of prosecution outweigh
the costs.] Matters pertinent to this determination include:
(1) the extent of the harm caused by the offense[;]
(2) possible improper motives of a complainant;
(3) reluctance of the victim to testify;
(4) effect of non-enforcement upon the community's sense of security and
confidence in the criminal justice system;
(5) the direct cost of prosecution in terms of prosecutorial time, court time,
and similar factors;
(6) prolonged nonenforcement of the statute on which the charge is based;
(7) the availability and likelihood of prosecution and conviction by another
jurisdiction;
(8) any assistance by the accused in the apprehension or conviction of other
offenders, in the prevention of offenses by others, in the reduction of the
impact of offenses committed by himself or others upon victims, and in
engaging [in] any other socially beneficial activity that might be
encouraged in others by not prosecuting the offender; and
(9) the effect of nonenforcement on police department morale.
[The third level is effect on the offender, including:]
(1) the impact of further proceedings on the accused and those close to him,
especially the likelihood and severity of financial hardship or disruption
of family life;
(2) the effect of further proceedings in preventing future offenses by the
offender in light of his commitment to criminal activity as a way of life;
6. Reporting and Training. In all cases, a prosecutor's office should implement a system of reporting
and supervisory review of investigative steps taken in all cases. In addition, training of all prosecutors
on the ethics of investigative proportionality should be available, required, and periodically repeated.
Id. at 752-53 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted).
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(3) the disparity of the authorized punishment in relation to the particular
offense or offender;
(4) the seriousness of his past criminal activity which he might reasonably
be expected to continue;
(5) the possibility that further proceedings might tend to create or reinforce
commitment on the part of the accused to criminal activity as a way of
life; and
(6) the availability of programs as diversion or sentencing alternatives that
may reduce the likelihood of future criminal activity. t14
Some proposed reforms are substantive in recommending policies to be
implemented instead of factors to be weighed. In recognition of the administra-
tive context of plea bargaining, for example, Professor Lynch recommends new
standards for prosecutors' dealings with defense attorneys.
Even if prosecutors are not subjected to a full range of administrative law
restrictions, it is likely that some reforms involving greater formality of
procedure could enhance the fairness of the process. In my view, the two
strongest candidates for formal recognition involve greater discovery rights,
and the formalization of the opportunity to be heard before prosecutorial
decisions are made.1
4 1
Professor Zacharias has recommended that prosecutors' offices establish specific
policies about plea bargaining and justice. About plea bargaining, he recom-
mends that prosecutors bargain in accordance with an explicit model. Their
administrative regulations and manuals should identify the model of plea
bargaining that the office expects individual prosecutors to use. 142 Offices should
"assign[] priorities to the varying interests ex ante."1 4 3 We have already seen that
Zacharias also recognizes the "need for more precise ethical directives, either
through formal rules, or, when flexibility is desirable, rebuttable presumptions"
linked to the prosecutor's duty to seek justice.'44
140. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 136, at 496-97 (footnotes omitted). See generally Abrams, supra note 22
(considering how to establish policies of prosecutorial discretion).
141. Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2147 (emphasis added).
142. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Justice in Plea Bargaining, 39 WM. & MARY L. REv. 1121 (1998).
143. Id. at 1183. See also id. at 1183-85 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) ("One cannot accomplish that
simply by listing the goals prosecutors should pursue. Such an approach ultimately would come to parallel the
unsatisfying discretionary approach of the current codes .... [I]dentifying a governing plea-bargaining theory
prevents individual prosecutors from imposing a misguided view of justice upon defendants and the public. It
both enables a prosecutorial agency to control its agents and makes the agency responsible for doing so. The
very existence of a plea-bargaining policy itself may serve to equalize treatment among defendants.").
144. Zacharias, supra note 131, at 49-50 (1991) ("The Article's interpretation of the codes' 'justice'
terminology is not intended to provide a touchstone for judicial enforcement. Defining the ethical standard,
however, should help prosecuting attorneys react to ethical dilemmas they confront in trial practice. On a larger
scale, it will enable federal agencies and local district attorneys offices to provide guidance for their staffs in
training programs and in establishing internal norms. Spelling out the meaning of the 'do justice' rule also may
provide a somewhat improved basis for professional discipline when individual prosecutors overstep their
290 [Vol. 14:259
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Professor Gershman explains in this symposium that office policies and
practices can encourage prosecutors to practice moral courage. "Moral courage"
is the ability to perform the prosecutor's job properly - by prosecuting some
cases and declining questionable cases.' 45 In contrast, office policies that focus
on conviction statistics hinder just prosecution.'
4 6
Although numerous lists of standards have been provided over many years, it
is still not clear how they are applied from office to office.
In effect, as the overbreadth of the formal substantive criminal law drives an
increase in prosecutorial power, the resulting growth of prosecutorial authority
will tend to increase pressure on prosecutors to develop internal administrative
practices and standards for the exercise of discretion that will become a
separate defacto substantive criminal law. The problem is that this body of law
is largely unwritten and may vary from district attorney to district attorney, or
even from individual prosecutor to individual prosecutor. 
147
Accordingly, offices need some kind of mechanism by which such standards will
be enforced. The reader of these pages can agree that reading lists of factors is not
likely to enhance good judgment.
B. ENFORCEMENT OF STANDARDS
1. MORE JUDICIAL REvIEW
Aware of previous failures in judicial review of prosecutorial discretion, many
reformers have recommended that their standards be enforced by judicial
oversight. Violation of office policies would provide the basis for judicial review
- a limited review, however, that does not address the merits of the policies
themselves.
bounds. Perhaps, more importantly, the Article highlights a need for more precise ethical directives, either
through formal rules, or, when flexibility is desirable, rebuttable presumptions.").
145. See Bennett Gershman, The Prosecutor's Duty to Truth, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHics (forthcoming Winter
2001) ("Such courage is possible only in an office that encourages prosecutors to be ministers of justice.
Prosecutors offices that instill such an ethos encourage prosecutors to discuss openly and critically with
supervisor and colleagues the kinds of issues discussed in this Article. Prosecutors should be encouraged to
evaluate a case critically with colleagues and supervisors to decide whether a prosecution should be undertaken
in view of questionable proof, and the existence of alternative prosecutorial choices.").
146. See id. ("A prosecutor's moral courage to judge the truthfulness of a witness may be influenced by
institutional considerations that discourage either critical evaluation or the ability to take appropriate action.
Prosecutors offices that are heavily influenced by conviction statistics - both to project a tough law-and-order
image and for leverage in budget negotiations - will probably maintain close supervision over individual
decision-making by assistants, and principled decisions that might be perceived as inconsistent with a strong
crime-fighting image may be discouraged. It is much more likely in such a setting that a possibly innocent
defendant will be required to accept a generous plea offer on the eve of trial rather than that the prosecutor will
dismiss a case in which she lacks confidence.") (footnotes omitted).
147. Lynch, supra note 21, at 61.
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[W]ith the promulgation of standards, judicial review could be limited to the
issue of abuse of discretion, the defendant being required to make at least a
colorable claim that his prosecution violated an established policy of the
prosecutor. The court would consider whether the prosecutor's decision was in
fact based on the standards and policies of the office or was motivated by
extraneous factors. Normally, the court would not review the merits of the
prosecutor's policy. Only in cases of the patent and complete absence of a
relationship between a prosecutorial standard and a legitimate law enforcement
objective would a court be authorized to invalidate the standard itself. 148
In 1981 Professor Goldstein proposed a "common law of prosecutorial discre-
tion" that would be developed by the courts in response to different fact-specific
cases. 149 Prosecutors would be held accountable for their decisions to charge or
to accept a plea by explaining to the court how they met the common law
standards. '5 0 Another proposal recommended an administrative standard for plea
bargaining, under which there would be "increased judicial review of the
prosecutor's decisions with other administrative law techniques, such as the
adoption of written guidelines and a requirement that the prosecutor justify his
guilty plea concessions with statements of reasons." 151
Many critics have complained that judicial oversight places little constraint on
prosecutorial conduct. For this reason, Professor Misner recommended that
prosecutorial decisions be linked to prison resources. 52 Meanwhile, Professor
148. Bubany & Skillern, supra note 136, at 504. See generally KENNETH CULP DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY
JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 188-214 (1969).
149. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 52, at 58-59 ("A substantial body of research as well as the guidelines recently
issued tells us why the prosecutor asks the court to dismiss or reduce a charge or to accept a guilty plea. His
request may be based on evidentiary grounds or on the desire to facilitate another prosecution by obtaining the
defendant's cooperation. He may wish to lighten an overly heavy case load or obtain treatment for a defendant
in a noncriminal process. He may be following a policy of non-enforcement of certain crimes or trying to gain
some procedural advantage, or he may want to avoid the risk of trial .... Ishall consider how judges might deal
with such reasons, case by case, in order to illustrate the rules and distinctions that may be fashioned in building
a common law of prosecutorial discretion - whether that discretion is exercised pursuant to guidelines or on an
ad hoc basis.").
150. See id. at 74 ("The most important consequence of judicial review - if it is reinforced by occasional
denial of motions to dismiss or rejection of guilty pleas - is that it would make the prosecutor more
accountable. He would have to explain and justify his departures from the formal rules, and his explanations
would become subject to verification. In some offices, sensible policies, rationally administered, would be
exposed to view and the judicial role would be minimal. In other offices, where policies are not consistent, a
burden ofjustification would reduce disparate treatment or require a rational basis for it. And it would minimize
the use of bogus rationalizations to mask the real decision rules. Case-by-case articulation of the grounds for
decision will bring to the fore competing statutory policies and the need for closer definition of what is best left
to the executive branch and what is to be decided by the judiciary.").
151. Donald G. Gifford, Meaningful Reform of Plea Bargaining: The Control of Prosecutorial Discretion,
1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 37, 74 (footnotes omitted).
152. Misner, supra note 50, at 722 ("The time has come to accept the fact that the due process approach of
ordering prosecutorial discretion has little support, as witnessed by the breadth of discretion permitted to the
prosecution by both the judicial and legislative branches of state governments. Consistency and fairness are
more likely to result from economic restraints and voter review than any attempt to place judicial controls upon
[Vol. 14:259
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Meares argues that "a system of financial rewards could influence the public
prosecutor's charging decisions and control prosecutorial misconduct occurring
at trial."'
153
2. TRAIING AND SUPERVISION
Because of skepticism about the capacity of courts to police prosecutorial
discretion, good recruitment, training, and supervision are common themes for
the internal reform of prosecutorial discretion and the enforcement of discretion-
ary standards. New prosecutors need thorough orientation programs; these
should be followed up with adequate re-training. 54 We have already seen that
Professor Little recognizes a "duty to seek supervision" and recommends a
"system of reporting and supervisory review of investigative steps" and constant
re-training. 155 Departmental review committees also provide oversight or review
of discretionary decisions, e.g., to seek the death penalty. 156 Defendants should
have a right to be heard not only by prosecutors but by prosecutorial
supervisors."'
"[J]udgment is cultivated through immersion in practice combined with
critical reflection on practical experiences."' 58 Prosecutorial judgment is devel-
oped within the practice and patterns of prosecutors' offices. Professor Kaplan
explained the interaction of experience and judgment in a 1965 article that
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. Therefore, in the final section, this Article proposes an outline for tying
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion directly to the availability of prison resources.").
153. Meares, supra note 43, at 852.
154. See generally Stanley Z. Fisher, In Search of the Virtuous Prosecutor: A Conceptual Framework, 15
AM J. CRIM. LAW 197, 256-60 (1988) (recommending programs of recruitment, training and reinforcement for
prosecutors., with orientation and follow-up); Levenson, supra note 38, at 568-70 (suggesting that prosecutors'
offices must "hire the right people," "train the people right," "establish tolerable inconsistency," and "remember
the goals of federal law enforcement.").
155. Little, supra note 16, at 752-53; but see Vorenberg, supra note 23, at 1544-45 (stating that manuals and
interoffice memoranda may not address charging and plea bargaining. Limiting discretion of line attorneys may
only push discretion upwards.).
156. See generally Horowitz, supra note 68 (recommending that committees in each county decide when
death penalty should be applied); id. at 2572 (recommending that state legislatures remove the capital
punishment decision "from the whims and idiosyncrasies of any individual, whether it be the governor or a
prosecutor"); Rory K. Little, The Federal Death Penalty: History and Some Thoughts About the Department of
Justice's Role, 26 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 347 (1999) (assessing DOJ Capital Case Review Committee and offering
suggestions for its improvement).
157. See Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2148.
158. David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in Dark Times, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 31, 32 (1995); see also DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 169 (1988) ("In
Brandeis' view, this unique combination of abstract reasoning ability and empirical keenness, debarred from the
ivory tower by the press of circumstances, teaches the lawyer judgment."); id. at 170 ("Taken together, these
traits make the lawyer an embodiment of Aristotelian phronesis, 'practical wisdom."'); id. at 171 ("But it is not
too farfetched to expect that legal training with its cultivation of practical judgment should enable lawyers to
form a better picture of the human consequences of institutional arrangements than can those of us who have no
comparable training. This is, the phronimos is especially well-suited to the kind of deliberation called for by the
Fourfold Root of Sufficient Reasoning.").
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described how certain office practices appropriately influenced prosecutorial
discretion in the Northern District of California. Individual judgments were
checked and illuminated by good training and by communication among the
attorneys in the office:
Although many different assistants made decisions as to whether to prosecute
different cases, there tended to be a strong consensus as to which cases should
and which should not be prosecuted. This was due to several factors: the
assistants shared a common perception of their role; each new assistant had
been taught the standards for prosecution by the other, more experienced hands;
assistants often discussed their decisions and asked advice of each other; and
finally, prosecutorial decisions were constantly being checked by the litigative
process.
[The effect of office practices was that] each assistant always had to recognize
the possibility that any cases in which he had authorized prosecution might
eventually have to be tried by someone else. The very fact that the decision to
prosecute might thus be carefully examined by another assistant who would
then have the problem of trying the case, was a powerful factor inducing
conformity to the general standards. This, of course, it not to say that all
assistants were equally venturesome or that they would weigh the different
variables in exactly the same way. However, differences in result caused by
these and many other personal qualities tended to be lessened by the generally
excellent communication among the assistants involved in criminal work and
by the fact that disagreements as to whether a case should have been prosecuted
were usually aired thoroughly.' 
59
More recently, alumni of the Southern District of New York have described the
merits of an office that includes good training and supervision and a practice of
good judgment. 160
A similar lesson arises from the experience of disciplinary agencies. Depart-
ment of Justice Inspector General Michael Bromwich recommends more input
from supervisors and more post mortems of prosecutorial mistakes: "there is not
enough of an ethic and a culture of learning from one's mistakes by focusing on
them." 1 6 ' Empirical studies suggest that such supervision (and a corresponding
ability to correct mistakes) does not occur in all prosecutors' offices:
[O]ffices in two districts expressly reject the notion of supervisory review,
insisting that line attorneys produce better results if they are entrusted with
unfettered discretion or that the office cannot hire excellent attorneys unless
they are granted unfettered control over their cases. We cannot know whether
the senior attorneys who gave us these explanations really believed them, but it
159. John Kaplan, The Prosecutorial Discretion -A Comment, 60 NW. U.L. REV. 174, 177-78 (1965).
160. See generally Symposium, The Changing Role of the Federal Prosecutor: In Memory of William Tendy,
26 FOR HAM URH. L.J. 737 (1999).
161. Id. at 758.
[Vol. 14:259
HeinOnline  -- 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 294 2000-2001
THE PRUDENT PROSECUTOR
is important to note here that these claims were on their face quite implausible
and that the great majority of management level prosecutors reject them. In
most offices, the idea of supervisory review is accepted in principle, but only a
few of our districts seriously implement it.' 
62
The goal of training and supervision is to develop good individual judgment so
that prosecutors will make fewer mistakes. It remains difficult to implement good
training procedures absent a concept of individual judgment.
C. JUDGMENT
A discretionary system requires good judgment from individual prosecutors.
Discretion has two components: accuracy and judgment. Accuracy is the
ability to process information, decide what actually happened, and deter-
mine what can be proved in court. For example, if a prosecutor misinter-
prets a forensic report and charges a person for murder based on that
mistake, it is an error in accuracy, not judgment. Judgment is the ability to
prosecute the most important cases. In other words, assuming the prosecu-
tor's view of the situation is correct, was the decision either to charge or not
to charge the correct one?
16 3
Good training and supervision may enhance accuracy, but can they form good
judgment? "We have little real notion of what mix of backgrounds, credentials,
advancement patterns, skills, and temperaments works well to produce effective
prosecutors under the traditional adversarial model, and still less whether the
same blend functions as well where the prosecutor increasingly serves a
quasi-judicial role."' 64 If the discretion of the individual prosecutor plays such an
enormous role in our criminal justice system, then we need a "real notion" of
good judgment.
Discussions of prosecutorial judgment have frequently invoked moral as well
as legal arguments. "Professor Davis named the principal ingredients for proper
exercise of prosecutorial discretion as facts, values and influences. Yet, as he
recognized, such decisions are generally intuitive."' 65 "When it comes right
162. Schulhofer & Nagel, supra note 66, at 1295 (emphasis added); see also Ilene H. Nagel & Stephen J.
Schulhofer, A Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the
Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REv. 501 (1992); Stephen J. Schulhofer & Ilene H. Nagel,
Negotiated Pleas Under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines: The First Fifteen Months, 27 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
231 (1989).
163. Michael Kades, Exercising Discretion: A Case Study of Prosecutorial Discretion in the Wisconsin
Department of Justice, 25 AM. J. CRtM. L. 115, 120 (1997) (emphasis added) (footnote omitted).
164. Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2150; see also Symposium, supra note 160, at 743 ("It
is some internal content in the prosecutor, himself and herself. And that is the hardest topic to talk about,
because we do not know how to raise character. We do not know how to train judgment. But we should at least
be raising that question explicitly and trying to have that conversation.").
165. Levenson, supra note 38, at 568 (footnote omitted).
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down to it, of course, there is no institutional substitute for personal integrity."1 66
Facts. Values. Influences. Intuitions. Integrity. Is the prosecutor's discretion legal
judgment, moral judgment, or some combination of the two?
Authors who envision a "virtuous prosecutor" suggest a moral component to
the prosecutor's task. Professor Fisher's virtuous prosecutor possesses "great
discretionary power" that "demands a high level of individual moral responsibil-
ity." 167 Fisher was skeptical about the ability of rules and guidelines to solve the
problem of discretion. 168 Instead, he thought that prosecutors' offices should hire
individuals who are willing to learn how to do justice. "[I]f competent
prosecution demands the integration of personal values and professional skills,
then prosecution agencies must encourage prosecutors to reunite their personal
and professional selves, which many learned to separate as students. The
question is how to do this."'
169
In contrast, Professor Uviller's virtuous prosecutor does not emphasize his
personal morality. Although the prosecutor must learn "[t]o refine the ethical
ingredient in the use of discretion,"1 70 this ethical ingredient is not the personal
morality of the prosecutor but the morality of the people he serves.
The prosecutor who senses the outrage of his constituency against the
aggressive and unsightly hordes of prostitutes infesting the streets may
ethically respond by stricter application of valid laws against prostitution. More
questionable, it seems to me, is the same campaign waged by the prosecutor as
166. UVILLER, supra note 36, at 66.
167. Fisher, supra note 154, at 255-56 (emphasis added).
168. See id. at 255-56 ("Leif Carter, an organizational analyst, has argued that prosecutorial decision making
is inherently uncontrollable by pre-ordained rules and guidelines. In his important study of California
prosecutors, he demonstrated that prosecutorial work is characterized by such uncertainty - regarding, e.g., the
causes of crime and the impact of penalties, the constantly changing 'facts' of cases, the diverse and conflicting
pressures from the work environment, the unpredictable behavior of judges, witnesses and other actors - that
efforts to define and enforce uniform policies are bound to fail. Instead of trying to restrict prosecutors'
autonomy, Carter concludes, agencies should accept individual discretion as a 'given' and adapt to it. He
recommends that district attorneys should hire subordinates who, regardless of their views of the best approach
to crime control, have the interest and ability to do criminal justice research and to share new knowledge with
their peers. Prosecutors should be individuals committed to continual learning in an atmosphere of uncertainty,
openness, and inquiry; research should be part of their job.
Carter's 'philosopher-king' model of prosecution might be impractical, but it points in the right direction.
Prosecution agencies should actively foster responsible exercise of inherent discretion by subordinates. Such an
approach would differ from the current one. Most prosecutors come to the job directly from law school and stay
only a few years. Typically thrown into the 'pit' without adequate training or supervision, they become absorbed
in mastering the knowledge and techniques of survival. Unprepared technically as they are, they are even less
prepared to handle their suddenly acquired power over human lives. Most of these neophytes come fresh from
the moral fragmentation and alienation of law school, and many feel 'cut away from themselves' even before
they arrive. They are eager for someone to tell them 'how to do it,' a safer and less painful course than forming
and asserting their own judgments, whether on matters of police credibility or - Heaven forbid- 'justice.' ").
169. Id at 256 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also Melilli, supra note 43, at 683-84 (arguing that
prosecutorial decisions rely on personal standards of integrity and fairness).
170. H. Richard Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor in Quest of an Ethical Standard. Guidance from the ABA,
71 MICH. L. REv. 1145, 1147 (1973) (emphasis added).
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self-appointed custodian of community morality, impelled by personal distaste
generated by his own values. I do not suggest that the honorable prosecutor be
the slave of his electorate. Indeed, in many matters his duty clearly lies in the
defiance of community pressures. But, within the confines of law, I would
rather see his discretion guided by an honest effort to discern public needs and
community concerns than by personal pique or moralistic impertinence. 171
Moral language also pervades discussions of the discretionary decision to
charge. Professor Levenson argues that prosecutors use a moral standard to fill
the gaps in the rules.
.Thus, charging decisions take place in a gap in the rules - a gap intentionally
left so that prosecutors can tailor justice. In order to fill the gap, prosecutors
must apply both a practical sense of what is right and a moral standard.
Practically, prosecutors must consider the likelihood of success if the case is
prosecuted and the availability of resources to achieve success. Morally,
prosecutors must consider whether conviction is "consistent with the public
interest," in conjunction with their personal sense of the defendant's culpability
for the crime, including the prosecutor's individual assessment of the credibil-
ity of witness' testimony, the accuracy of evidence and the need to punish the
defendant for his actions. 1
7 2
Professor Gershman proposed A Moral Standard for the Prosecutor's Exercise of
the Charging Discretion.73 He explained that various legal, political, experien-
tial, and ethical considerations inform and guide the charging decision.
Legal considerations include an evaluation of the strength of the case, the
credibility of complainants and witnesses, the existence and admissibility of
corroborating proof, and the nature and strength of the defense. Political
considerations include an assessment of the harm caused by the offense, the
availability of investigative and litigation resources, the existence of non-
criminal alternatives, and an alertness to relevant social and community
concerns. Experiential considerations include the prosecutor's background,
training, experience, intuition, judgment, and common sense. Ethical consider-
ations involve a sensitive appreciation that in the context of the above factors,
the ends of justice would be served by criminal prosecution, and that neither
171. Id. at 1152-53.
172. Levenson, supra note 38, at 558 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 570 (emphasis
added) ("[u]nlike in war, there is room in the prosecutorial role for a prosecutor to turn to his or her own
conscience in making decisions.") (emphasis added); Lynch, supra note 21, at 2149 ("Whether or not formal
rules to increase the fairness of prosecutorial procedures are the answer, a well-run district attorney's or United
States Attorney's office must do whatever it can - as the best such offices already do - to instill a sense of
fairness in the mostly young lawyers who serve on the front lines. Far more important than any rule permitting
defense attorneys to be heard is the spirit in which such hearings are conducted. Prosecutors should be trained to
approach their determinations of appropriate dispositions in a spirit of fairness and neutrality, as befits a
governmental decision deeply adverse to a member of the community.").
173. Gershman, supra note 25.
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personal, political, discriminatory, nor retaliatory motives have influenced the
charging decision. 1
7 4
Gershman advocated a standard of moral certainty before prosecutors proceed to
charge. '
75
The moral certainty standard has many competitors. Professor Zacharias's
prosecutor charges "only persons she truly considers guilty." 176 Professor Uviller
argues that when the issue is "in equipoise," the prosecutor may submit the case
to the jury.' 7 7 Professor Freedman rejects the equipoise view for a reasonable
doubt standard.' 78 Professor Kaplan wrote that the prosecutor must "actually
believe" that the accused is guilty, -and that it was "morally wrong" to initiate a
prosecution unless one was "personally convinced" of guilt. 1
79
Our prudent prosecutor errs in favor of disclosure. One virtuous prosecutor
integrates personal and professional morality, while another refines the ethical
ingredient by considering the morality of the people. They follow conscience
beyond a reasonable doubt or to a moral certainty. All of them seek justice. Moral
language permeates discussions of prosecutorial discretion.
The proposals and the uncertainty about discretion raise the question: Does
one need good moral judgment in order to be a good prosecutor? In Part III, I
explore what insights legal ethics provides on that question.
174. Id. at 513 nn.3-6 (emphasis added).
175. Id. ("My thesis is that the prosecutor should engage in a moral struggle over charging decisions, and
should not mechanically initiate charges. First, the prosecutor should apply all of the legal, political, experiential
and ethical factors noted above. After considering these factors, and before making the ultimate decision to
charge, the prosecutor should then assureherself that she is morally certain that the defendant is both factually
and legally guilty, and that criminal punishment is morally just.
'The standard of moral certainty' requires the prosecutor to engage in a rigorous moral dialogue in the context
of factual, political, experiential, and ethical considerations. It also requires the prosecutor to make and give
effect to the kinds of bedrock value judgments that underlie our system of justice - that the objective of
convicting guilty persons is outweighed by the objective of ensuring that innocent persons are not punished.").
176. Zacharias, supra note 131, at 50 (1991) ("At the charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing stages, the
heart of the codes' mandate to do justice seems clear: the prosecutor should exercise discretion so as to
prosecute only persons she truly considers guilty, and then only in a manner that fits the crime.").
177. Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor, supra note 170, at 1159 ("Thus, when the issue stands in equipoise in
his own mind, when he is honestly unable to judge where the truth of the matter lies, I see no flaw in the conduct
of the prosecutor who fairly lays the matter before the judge or jury.").
178. See FREEDMAN, supra note 43, at 219-220; id. at 221 ("In major part because of the unacceptable
consequences of Professor Uviller's position, I agree with those prosecutors who will not go forward unless they
are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty. Beyond that, I have argued that a prosecutor
should be professionally disciplined for proceeding with a prosecution if a fair-minded person could not
reasonably conclude, on the facts known to the prosecutor, that the accused is guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt."). See also Melilli, supra note 43, at 701 ("[T]he conscientious prosecutor, in zealous pursuit of society's
interest in justice, does not and should not pursue cases unless personally satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt of
the defendants' guilt.").
179. Kaplan, supra note 159, at 178 ("It was generally agreed that, regardless of the strength of the case, if
the prosecutor did not actually believe in the guilt of the accused, he had no business prosecutingThis was more
than a mere question of prosecutorial policy. The great majority, if not all, of the assistants felt that it was
morally wrong to prosecute a man unless one was personally convinced of his guilt.").
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III. MORAL JUDGMENT
A. SUBSTANTIVE MORAL JUDGMENT
Morality-centered theorists have had an important influence on contempo-
rary legal ethics. The morality-centered theorists examine legal ethics from
the perspective of substantive moral theory.' 80 They have addressed the
relationship of role morality and common morality by asking, e.g., whether a
good person can be a good lawyer or whether the adversary system permits
conduct that would be prohibited by ordinary or universal morality. Their
theme is illustrated in the "moral" of the first eight chapters of David Luban's
Lawyers and Justice: "nothing permits a lawyer to discard her discretion or
relieves her of the necessity of asking whether a client's project is worthy of a
decent person's service."18'
Professor Luban has written that "[t]he practice of plea-bargaining is
extremely troubling on both moral and political grounds." 182 Professor
Smith decides the role morality question against prosecutors in this sym-
posium by concluding that it is unlikely that one can be a good person
and a good prosecutor. Like other role morality theorists, she bases this
conclusion on an exploration of the context of criminal lawyering and the
institutional and cultural pressures that corrupt the good intentions of
prosecutors. 183
"We have nowhere else to stand but on our own two feet."' 84 Individuals must
make their own judgments about the morality of their roles and the obligations
they impose. Based on their moral commitments, they must decide whether to
participate in the adversary system. Like all persons, prosecutors are not freed of
the obligation to consider the morality of their role. Nor should those who accept
the role discard their consciences. When "the law points to a result that violates
their deeply help moral beliefs,"' 85 they may (or must) choose civil disobedience,
with a corresponding penalty.
When individuals confront such decisions - to devote their lives to
prosecution or to dissent from what the law requires - their decisions "will only
be as sound as their ethical intuitions .... When one's position, income, or
friendships can turn on one's ethical choices, it is hard to trust, and perhaps even
180. See David Luban, Reason and Passion in Legal Ethics, 51 STAN. L. REV. 873, 881(1999) (Tracing
history of legal ethics, and pointing out that Luban et al. were identifying a mistake in moral theory in legal
ethics; Simon sees a mistake of jurisprudence.)
181. DAVID LUBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 174 (1988).
182. Id. at 60.
183. Abbe Smith, Can You Be a Good Person and a Good Prosecutor?, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
(Forthcoming Winter 2001).
184. ARTHUR ISAK APPLBAUM, ETHICS FOR ADVERSARIES: THE MORALITY OF ROLES IN PUBLIC AND
PROFESSIONAL LIFE 219 (1999).
185. RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY 113-14 (1999).
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to know, one's intuitions about justice." 186 In such circumstances, substantive
moral theories illuminate individual moral choices.
Ethical prosecutors are bound to exercise their discretion in a manner that is
consistent with seeking justice. ' 87 Does this mean that prosecutors who possess a
substantive theory of morality are best suited to develop good judgment for
discretionary prosecutorial decisions?
No. Despite the claims of many writers that prosecutorial discretion includes
moral judgment, there is no evidence that substantive moral judgment improves
prosecutorial discretion.Indeed, allowing appeal to the variety of religious and
philosophical substantive theories of justice available to prosecutors could
undermine prosecutorial uniformity, expanding rather than contracting unfettered
prosecutorial discretion. Conflicting substantive theories of morality are not
likely to solve the problem of unreviewed and unreviewable prosecutorial
discretion.
The same problem confronts those who recommend character as the basis of
good legal judgment. In traditional philosophy, persons of character have a habit
of good moral judgment. In legal ethics, Dean Kronman has argued that:
[T]he outstanding lawyer ... is not simply an accomplished technician but a
person of prudence or practical wisdom as well. It is of course rewarding to
become technically proficient in the law. But earlier generations of American
lawyers conceived their highest goal to be the attainment of a wisdom that lies
beyond technique - a wisdom about human beings and their tangled affairs
that anyone who wishes to provide real deliberative counsel must possess. They
understood this wisdom to be a trait of character that one acquires by becoming
a person of good judgment, and not just an expert in the law. 188
This ideal assumes a strong link between excellent legal work and character, for it
"affirm[s] that a lawyer can achieve a level of real excellence in his work only by
acquiring certain valued traits of character." 189
Some individuals possess good character because they have the habit of
making good decisions within their substantive moral theories. Some
prosecutors possess good judgment because they have the accumulated
wisdom that arises from trying numerous criminal defendants. They are good
at legal reasoning, adept at distinguishing truth-tellers from liars, and
conscientious in requesting advice from their colleagues and superiors. In
other words, they may exercise good judgment without demonstrating good
character. The relationship between good legal judgment and good substan-
186. Heidi Li Feldman, Apparently Substantial, Oddly Hollow: The Enigmatic Practice of Justice, 97 MIcH.
L. REV. 1472, 1482 (1999).
187. See Green, supra note 130.
188. ANTHONY T. KRoNMAN, FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 2 (1993) (emphasis added).
189. Id. at 16 (emphasis added).
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tive moral judgment is uncertain.' 90 About a concrete linkage between them,
there are good reasons to remain agnostic.
Perhaps because it is rooted in substantive moral theory, an ideal of character,
moreover, remains "vague" about specific practices.1 9 ' Aristotelian or Kantian
practical reason may not be practical enough for prosecutors.
Anthony Kronman is wrong to say that "the kind of moral quandary in which
ordinary men and women find themselves from time to time, and which
demands the exercise of reason, is for judges a routine predicament." He is
confusing moral with normative, and moral reasoning with reasoning. Judges
routinely confront issues that cannot be resolved by the application of an
algorithm, that require instead the application of practical reason - that
ensemble of methods, including gut reaction, that people use to make decisions
when the methods of science or logic are unavailable or unavailing. This
doesn't mean that the judge is in a "moral quandary" and has to employ
something called "moral reason" to get out. Editing a newspaper requires the
constant use of practical reason, but only very occasionally the making of
moral judgments. 192
In this instance, prosecutors are like judges and newspaper editors. Neither
substantive moral theory nor moral character may teach the prudent prosecutor
the best exercise of her discretion. The Aristotelian ethics of virtue (which
includes prudence) attributed "special moral insight to the virtuous agent....
Where the law is indeterminate, however, what operates is not insight but
discretion. In such cases we make nonmoral choices among permissible acts."
' 19 3
B. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL JUDGMENT
If substantive moral theories should not guide prosecutorial discretion, perhaps
the law itself contains moral principles capable of resolving discretionary
questions. In legal ethics, Professor Simon has argued that the discretionary ethic
190. But see Luban & Millemann, supra note 158, at 31 ("The centerpiece of our discussion is the concept of
judgment. It is a commonplace that good judgment is the most valuable thing a lawyer has to offer clients -
more valuable than legal learning or skillful analysis of doctrine.... We suggest that just as good judgment is
the most valuable thing a lawyer has to offer clients, good moral judgment is the heart of legal ethics.").
191. Heidi Li Feldman, Codes and Virtues: Can Good Lawyers Be Good Ethical Deliberators?, 69 S. CALL.
REV. 885, 914 (1996) ("The flaws in Kronman's use of virtue ethics instruct my effort. His account is too
judicially oriented and the virtues he discusses are too vague."); WILLIAM H. SIMON, THE PRACTICE OF JUSTICE: A
THEORY OF LAWYERS' ETHICS 23 (1998) ("In 400 pages ostensibly devoted to lawyers' ethics, [the book] does
not mention a single instance of lawyering."); Luban & Millemann, supra note 158, at 60 (noting that
Kronman's practical reason is intellectualist, in the Kantian tradition, rather than practice-oriented, following
Aristotle.).
192. POSNER, supra note 185, at 113; see also id. at 114 (opposing judging cases according to "academic
moralism," which is "taking sides on contested moral issues and using normative moral philosophy to resolve
the contest." "You don't find moral theory deployed in appeals from convictions for rape or murder, even though
the criminalizing of rape and murder is based upon a moral principle; and its absence is not missed.").
193. J. B. SCHNEEWIND, THE INVENTION OF AUTONOMY 77 (1998).
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of the prosecutor (the "Contextual View") provides the model for all lawyers:
lawyers and prosecutors are "to seek justice."'194 Because it incorporates moral
principles, the legal norm of justice provides guidance for discretionary
decisions:
Following [Ronald] Dworkin, Simon insists that the substance of any body of
law is defined, constituted, and constrained by moral principles of justice. In
Anglo-American law at least, and maybe in any mature legal system, it is just
not possible to accurately state a legal claim or argument without incorporating
the principles of justice that define its limits and animate its core. Non-
positivist moral principles such as "no person should profit from his own
wrong," or "manufacturers should not fleece the unsuspecting public through
form contracts that strip them of their rights to recourse in the event of
negligently caused personal injury," for example, are not willy-nilly superim-
posed when a judge feels like it upon a body of otherwise positivistically pure
and straightforward and amoral estate or contract laws. Rather, such principles
of justice - potentially infinite in number and mind boggling in their
complexity - are central to the law itself. 19 5
With his emphasis on legal justice, Simon "rejects the common tendency to
attribute the tensions of legal ethics to a conflict between the demands of legality
on the one hand and those of nonlegal, personal or ordinary morality on the
other."196 "Simon's is a law-centered theory... [in contrast to] alternatives that
view legal ethics as 'applications of ordinary morality' - what might be called
morality-centered theories." 19
7
Contextual legal ethics advises prosecutors to seek justice. Simon insists that
contextual or discretionary decisions about justice are not "assertions of personal
preference, nor are they applications of ordinary morality.... They are legal
judgments grounded in the methods and sources of authority of the professional
culture. I use 'justice' interchangeably with 'legal merit.""'198
194. SIMON, supra note 191, at 10 (1998); see also William H. Simon, Ethical Discretion in Lawyering, 101
HARV. L. REV. 1083 (1988).
195. Robin West, The Zealous Advocacy of Justice in a Less Than Ideal World, 51 STAN. L. REV. 973, 977-78
(1999).
196. Simon, supra note 194, at 1113-14; see also Luban, supra note 180, at 873-74 ("According to Simon,
conventional conceptions of legal ethics misunderstand the nature of law. They fail to appreciate the resources
that law contains, and they overlook the crucial role that lawyers' discretionary judgments play in mobilizing
those resources and bringing them to life .... he offers a rigorous and far-reaching argument that legal ethics
requires lawyers to make contextual, discretionary ethical judgments, rather than taking refuge behind
categorical rules of zeal, confidentiality, and moral neutrality toward the client's ends.").
197. Luban, supra note 180, at 874 ; see also id. at 883 ("Where the role theorists favor a 'law/morals
characterization' of value conflicts, Simon prefers a 'law/law characterization."').
198. See SIMON, supra note 191, at 138 ("Lawyers should take those actions that, considering the relevant
circumstances of the particular case, seem likely to promote justice. . ,. 'Justice' here connotes the basic values
of the legal system and subsumes many layers of more concrete norms. Decisions about justice are not
assertions of personal preferences, nor are they applications of ordinary morality. The latter has the advantage of
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Yet as often as Simon reiterates this point, it is difficult to see how his theory
can meet this criticism that it allows assertion of personal preferences. Simon
does not give substantive content to justice. He acknowledges that different
theories of justice will influence the decisions of individual lawyers. "Lawyers
are not by nature systematic moral philosophers, but their working theories
include intuitions from all these doctrines.' 99 Under the Contextual View they
will employ these theories, these "intuitions," as a personal preference in order to
provide content to the admonition to seek justice. This law-based theory allows
continuing re-interpretation of the law in light of moral principles. Luban
pinpoints the flaw succinctly when he states that "[t]he law-centered view of legal
ethics turns out to be a morality-centered view in disguise., 20 As such, it cannot
solve the problem of unreviewed or arbitrary discretion, and cannot ensure
uniformity of prosecutorial practices.
The Contextual View is based on the ethics of prosecutors. Simon does not say
much, however, about the practice of prosecution. Nor does he devote much
attention to the institutional restraints on discretion that are necessary in
prosecutors' offices.20 1 It is the practices and institutions of prosecution,
however, that cultivate good judgment in prosecutorial discretion.
C. PUBLIC MORAL JUDGMENT
Because of these practices and institutions, a different question of role morality
is relevant to our practicing prosecutor. With Luban and Smith, Professor
Applbaum holds that we should not encourage "obedient servants" to do
whatever their role dictates. Applbaum adds a second important point: we should
reminding us that we are concerned with the materials of conventional legal analysis; the former has the
advantage of reminding us that these materials include many vaguely specified aspirational norms.").
199. Id. at 82.
200. Luban, supra note 180, at 875; id. at 891 ("Apparently, Simon thinks you can find anything you want in
the law, as long as some moral principle supports it. Here he departs from Dworkin.").
201. See Robert W. Gordon, The Radical Conservatism of the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 919,
921-22 (1999) (review essay) ("In keeping with his project of internal critique, Simon's focus is primarily
ethical rather than institutional, that is, on critique and reform of lawyers' ethical responses to dilemmas that the
legal system as it currently operates routinely puts them in, rather than to the systems and structures that create
the dilemmas .... Any set of legal institutions or processes will be subject to malfunctions that will cause major
shortfalls from the ideals of equal and effective justice. His question is: How should a responsible lawyer adapt
his practice to such failures?"); Tanina Rostain, Waking Up From Uneasy Dreams: Professional Context,
Discretionary Judgment, and the Practice of Justice, 51 STAN. L. REv. 955, 956 (1999) (review essay) ("In
limiting himself to individual dilemmas, Simon neglects the role that social and organizational factors play in
shaping lawyers' judgments."); Deborah L. Rhode, Symposium Introduction: In Pursuit of Justice, 51 STAN. L.
REV. 867, 872 (1999) ("Although the final chapter of The Practice of Justice proposes some promising reforms,
Simon gives little attention to how they might be achieved or to the social, economic, and political barriers that
stand in the way. A truly contextual analysis, as Tanina Rostain's essay suggests, requires greater attention to
these barriers, as well as to the organizational settings and collegial relationships that shape lawyers' practice.
Because Simon's analysis is almost entirely jurisprudential rather than structural, we get well-developed
aspirations but without an equally well-developed program for institutionalizing them.").
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not be governed by "entrepreneurs" who impose their own view of morality on
everyone else. "[N]either the obedient servant nor the catch-me-if-you-can
entrepreneur are proper models of official discretion. 2 °2
The entrepreneur comment is important in the context of prosecutors who
possess so much discretion. We know that they are hard to catch; their work is
unreviewed and unreviewable. Prosecutors are like politicians and other
executive officials. A significant part of their role is to represent the people,
not their own conceptions of justice and morality. "If the claim is that each
executive official should decide whether or not a statute violates moral rights,
and that each should refuse to carry out his enforcement functions whenever
he makes that judgment, then the claim is wrong .... However broad the
appropriate range for individual judgment, he is, first and foremost, a
representative of society at large and of the legislature, which is society's
formal voice. '20 3 Professor Uviller was correct to insist that the virtuous
prosecutor pursues the morality of the people he serves - public (not
personal) morality. "I do not suggest that the honorable prosecutor be the
slave of his electorate. Indeed, in many matters his duty clearly lies in the
defiance of community pressures. But, within the confines of law, I would
rather see his discretion guided by an honest effort to discern public needs and
community concerns than by personal pique or moralistic impertinence. ' 20
4
Our law is rooted in moral principles. "[S]ome legal principles, notably those
of the criminal law, are plainly informed by the moral opinions of the
community" 20 5 and are based on moral concepts. But it is not substantive moral
judgment that best illuminates discretion in criminal law. Like police discretion,
prosecutorial discretion strikes a balance between collective and individual
discretion - within a range of policies.
It is one thing to say that certain matters ought to be left to police discretion; it
is another to say that they ought to be left to individual police discretion. As far
202. APPLBAUM, supra note 184, at 12 (emphasis added).
203. KENT GREENWALT, CONFLICTS OF LAW AND MORALITY 354-55 (1987).
204. Uviller, The Virtuous Prosecutor supra note 170, at 1152-53.
205. POSNER, supra note 185, at 114; see also id. at 141 n. 95 ("But I do wish to emphasize the difference
between basing a judicial decision on a moral consensus and basing it on moral theory viewed as a method of
resolving contested moral issues."); see also Lynch, supra note 21, at 64 ("Moreover, to the extent that
prosecutors are given to understand that the moral authority of the criminal law is one of the limited resources
that they are responsible to allocate wisely, the development of moral standards for prosecution, in default of
moral standards of criminal law-making, becomes not merely an ethical imperative but a practical part of the
prosecutor's accepted function. Just as a prosecutor (or a police department) may decide that its limited
personnel, money, or energy can best be concentrated on particularly harmful or frequent crimes, shifting
resources from auto theft to narcotics enforcement to burglary investigations depending on current trends in
criminal behavior, so it makes eminent sense to concentrate the moral resources of criminal prosecution by
focusing effort on those cases for which the criminal sanction was designed, prosecuting primarily cases in
which the public designation of an offender as an outlaw is deserved, and can be made to stick - in the moral
judgment of the community as well as in court.").
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as discretion is concerned, there are some things that police (collectively) are
probably in the best position to decide. There are other things that ought to be
left to the judgment of individual police officers. Striking some sort of balance
between these two is one of the most problematic tasks for police policy
makers.2 0 6
For the police, Professor Kleinig recommends. that the discretionary labor be
divided so that the greatest temptations can be avoided.
Prosecutors may be greatly tempted to become moral entrepreneurs, especially
once they realize that their discretion is unreviewed and unreviewable. The
prosecutor's "[eithical considerations involve a sensitive appreciation that ... the
ends of justice would be served by criminal prosecution, and that neither
personal, political, discriminatory, nor retaliatory motives have influenced the
charging decision.' 20 7 Moral entrepreneurs may mistakenly pursue their own
personal, political, discriminatory or retaliatory agenda. Accordingly the first
check on the prosecutor is to consult the policies developed by her office.
Prosecutorial offices should limit entrepreneurs by developing specific office
standards of discretion and mandating training, consultation, supervision and
review.
The increased criminalization of conduct by the legislature has expanded the
role of discretion in enforcing the law. In such circumstances, many prosecutors'
offices already follow implicit or explicit policies. Yet "the fact of the matter is
that we just do not know, in any systematic way, what kinds of standards are
being used by our administrative adjudicators. 2 °8
We have seen above the types of reforms that should be made. In each office
there is a need for "precise ethical directives, either through formal rules, or,
when flexibility is desirable, rebuttable presumptions., 20 9 "[S]ome reforms
206. JOHN KLEINIG, THE ETHICS OF POLICING 210 (1996).
207. Gershman, supra note 25, at 522 (emphasis added).
208. Lynch, supra note 21, at 62-63; see also id. at 60 ("But because we have limited ourselves, on the
whole, to deploring the overbroad criminal law that leads to an excessive reliance on prosecutorial discretion,
we have failed to study in any serious way how that discretion is exercised, or to provide prosecutors with
guidance to exercise their judgment appropriately. Just as we are relatively blind to the actual operative rules of
criminal procedure used to dispose of most of our criminal cases, we are almost completely ignorant of the
operative rules of substantive criminal law that are being applied within that system."); id. at 62-63 ("In my
experience, the substantive moral standards applied by prosecutors in many cases parallel the canons of a more
human criminal law than appears in our statutes and appellate decisions. Moral blameworthiness, for example,
tends to be important to prosecutors; 'how could he know that the pills were mislabeled?' is an objection
prosecutors tend to take seriously, if convinced of the factual predicate. But the fact of the matter is that we just
do not know, in any systematic way, what kinds of standards are being used by our administrative adjudicators.
Moreover, because the role of the prosecutor in devising such standards is not fully recognized or legitimated,
prosecutors themselves may shy away from this understanding of what they are doing, or, worse, may ignore the
function altogether, defining themselves simply as adversarial enforcers of the overbroad criminal law handed
to them by the legislatures and the courts.").
209. Zacharias, supra note 21, at 50.
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involving greater formality of procedure could enhance the fairness of the
process."21o
Even published discretionary standards are insufficient to restrain moral
entrepreneurs. Public moral judgment is developed through training by more
experienced prosecutors and through consultation with peers and supervisors.
Unfettered discretion is checked in offices where "the assistants shared a
common perception of their role; each new assistant had been taught the
standards for prosecution by the other, more experienced hands; assistants often
discussed their decisions and asked advice of each other; and finally, prosecuto-
rial decisions were constantly being checked by the litigative process.
2 11
Accordingly, in all matters, prosecutors should test their judgment by consulting
fellow prosecutors. In addition, "[i]n any non-routine or high-profile matter,...
the investigating prosecutor should seek supervisory review and approval of his
or her proportionate evaluation before proceeding."21 2
Finally, "[m]eaningful control of discretion is impossible without at least some
form of internal administrative review. ', 21 3 Offices should conduct regular case
reviews on discretionary matters. The consultation, reporting and supervision
requirements should be recorded throughout the case file. The records will
demonstrate whether consultation and supervision occurred.
For separation of powers reasons, courts will remain reluctant to police
prosecutorial misconduct and abuse of prosecutorial discretion. It is often
difficult for courts and investigators to determine the mental state of prosecutors,
and so misconduct is undiscovered or undeterred. Disciplinary agencies can,
however, fill in some of the gaps. Failure to consult with peers or supervisors, or
to seek review of discretionary decisions, is more easily identifiable and
reviewable than the mental state of prosecutors. The OPR reports, for example,
illustrate that it is difficult to define good judgment but easy to determine (and to
hold someone responsible) for failure to consult a supervisor or to gain approval
from Main Justice.214
CONCLUSION
Criminal law "cannot be applied mechanically but demand[s] the use of
judgment." '15 For this reason, our criminal justice system permits prosecutors
vast discretion, in investigation, charging, plea bargaining and sentencing. "[T]he
210. Lynch, Administrative System, supra note 21, at 2147 (emphasis added).
211. Kaplan, supra note 159, at 177-78.
212. Little, supra note 16, at 752-53.
213. Comment, supra note 15, at 965.
214. See Office of Professional Responsibility, Fiscal Year 1997 Report, Fiscal Year 1996 Report, available
at http://www.usdoj.gov/opr/index.htnil.
215. DWORKIN, supra note 21, at 31 (1978) (emphasis added).
[Vol. 14:259
HeinOnline  -- 14 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 306 2000-2001
THE PRUDENT PROSECUTOR
person who shows discretion is one who manifests good, sound, careful, or wise
judgment in practical, and particularly interpersonal, affairs. ' 216
Everyone praises good judgment. Discussions of prosecutorial discretion,
however, show much confusion about what it is, and what mix of moral and legal
reasoning enhances it. In this Article I have argued that substantive moral
judgment is not the core of prosecutorial discretion. Prosecutorial discretion
requires public moral judgment, a judgment rooted in prosecutorial practice and
experience. Prosecutorial discretion is not the same as moral discretion;
prosecutors should not be moral entrepreneurs who make discretionary decisions
according to their own substantive theories of justice. Their legal role does not
permit unfettered moral discretion.
Prosecutorial discretion requires attention to office policies and procedures.
Prosecutorial offices should develop specific policies of discretion and mandate
training, consultation, supervision and review of discretionary choices. Failure to
consult with peers or supervisors, or to seek review of discretionary decisions,
provides an identifiable basis for disciplinary sanction, one more enforceable
than the post-trial standards of review employed in Agurs. Good office policies
could explain to prosecutors how and whether to err in favor of disclosure in
circumstances similar to the Agurs case.
216. KLEINIG, supra note 206, at 82.
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